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Industrialisation	  and	   industrial	  policy	  have	  been	  recently	   returned	   to	  policy	  debate	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  
Africa	  following	  a	  hiatus	  for	  some	  three	  decades	  since	  the	  implementation	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	  
Programmes	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   debt	   crisis.	   However,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   current	   debate,	   and	   the	  
perceived	   role	   and	   form	  of	   industrialisation	  and	   industrial	   policy	  differs	   greatly	   from	   thinking	   that	  
informed	   industrial	   policy	   in	   the	   post-­‐liberation	   period	   of	   the	   1960s	   and	   70s	   that	  were	   rooted	   in	  
classical	  political	  economy,	  the	  (structuralist)	  development	  economics	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s.	  1	  
	  
At	   the	   level	   of	   the	   international	   financial	   institutions	   and	   development	   agencies,	   Justin	   Lin’s	   New	  
Structural	  Economics	  (NSE)	  has	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  as	  orthodox	  (neoclassical)	  theoretical	   justification	  
for	  industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  21st	  century.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Global	  Value	  Chain	  Development	  (GVCD)	  
as	  the	  process	  of	  entry	  into	  and	  upgrading	  along	  transnational	  supply	  chains,	  has	  emerged	  in	  recent	  
debates	   on	   African	   industrialisation.	   This	   paper	   investigates	   the	   conjuncture	   of	   these	   two	  
approaches	  both	   in	   terms	  of	   their	   theoretical	  underpinnings	  as	  well	   as	   the	  policy	   conclusions	   that	  
develop	  out	  of	  these	   lines	  of	  thinking.	  We	  compare	  both	  the	  explicit	  and	   implicit	  understanding	  of	  
industrial	   development	   in	   economic	   growth	   within	   GVCD	   and	   NSE	   approaches	   with	   those	   from	  
classical	   political	   economy	  and	  heterodox	  economics	   in	  order	   to	   assess	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   these	  
approaches	  inform	  industrial	  strategies	  that	  can	  result	  in	  employment	  creating,	  self-­‐reinforcing	  and	  
rapid	   inclusive	   economic	   growth	   through	   the	   growth	   of	   manufacturing.	   We	   then	   draw	   upon	   the	  
notion	  of	  the	  Minerals	  Energy	  Complex	  (MEC)	  as	  a	  historical	  political	  economy	  approach	  to	  industrial	  
development	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  assess	  the	  scope	  and	  limitations	  of	  resource	  based	  industrialisation	  
in	  delivering	  broad-­‐based	  and	  equitable	  growth	  in	  African	  economies	  today.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  literature	  on	  industrial	  policy	  is	  vast:	  a	  good	  entry	  point	  into	  understanding	  the	  debates	  is	  provided	  by	  Akyuz	  and	  Gore	  (2001)	  as	  well	  
as	  Kenny	  and	  Williams	  (2001).	  
2. Classical	  Political	  Economy	  and	  the	  causal	  significance	  of	  manufacturing	  in	  growth	  	  	  
	  
Both	  the	  definition	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  industrial	  structure	  and	  organisation	  in	  economic	  growth	  
have	  been	  variously	  understood.	  Orthodox	  economics	  places	   little	  emphasis	  on	  the	  composition	  of	  
economic	  activities	  in	  terms	  of	  shares	  of	  employment,	  value	  added	  and	  output	  of	  different	  industrial	  
sub-­‐sectors	   -­‐	  which	   together	  describe	   the	  structure	  of	   industry	   -­‐	  and	   ignores	   the	  vertical	   structure	  
(i.e.	  input-­‐output	  dimension)	  of	  production.	  Aside	  from	  considerations	  of	  (factor)	  productivity	  –	  that	  
can	   vary	   across	   industries	   and	   scale	   -­‐	   all	   economic	   sectors	   look	   alike/contribute	   in	   the	   same	  way	  
(albeit	   not	   equally	   in	   magnitude)	   to	   GDP	   and	   GDP	   growth.	   This	   is	   evident	   in	   the	   approach	   of	  
orthodox	  economists	  to	  industrial	  policy	  as	  being	  universal,	  macro	  and	  market	  facilitating	  or	  towards	  
the	   exploitation	   of	   potential	   static	   gains	   from	   trade	   or,	   as	   in	   the	   most	   recent	   turn	   by	   orthodox	  
economists	   towards	   industrial	   policy,	   the	   reduction	   of	   transaction	   costs	   associated	   with	  
agglomeration	  for	  example	  (Lin	  2009).	  
	  
By	   contrast,	   heterodox	  economists	  have	  emphasised	   the	   causal	   significance	  of	   industrial	   structure	  
and	   the	   special	   role	   played	   by	   different	   industrial	   subsectors	   at	   different	   stages	   of	   industrial	  
development	   and	   ‘catch-­‐up’,	   together	   with	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	   role	   of	   input-­‐output	   linkages	  
between	   subsectors.	   The	   developmental	   state	   literature,	   for	   example,	   stresses	   the	   importance	   of	  
developing	  a	  domestic	   capital	   goods	  and	   industrial	   input	   sectors	   to	   serve	  domestic	  manufacturing	  
(Woo-­‐Cummings	   1999).	   The	   economics	   of	   the	   Developmental	   State	   debate	   harks	   back	   to	   the	  
theories	  developed	  by	  classical	  development	  economists	  who	  afforded	  manufacturing	  a	  unique	  and	  
central	  role	   in	  bringing	  about	  the	  growth	   in	  an	  economy.	  These	  theorists	  also	  exalted	  the	  dynamic	  
character	  of	   industrial	  development	  as	  passing	   through	  stages	  marked	  by	  structural	   shifts	  brought	  
about	   by	   changing	   patterns	   of	   demand	   and	   sources	   of	   growth	   as	   capitalist	   development	  matures	  	  
(e.g.	  Kaldor	  1953,	  1978;	  Kuznets	  1957;	  Hirschman	  1958;	  Rosenstein-­‐Rodan	  1943).	  	  
	  
The	   special	   role	   ascribed	   to	   manufacturing	   in	   economic	   development	   came	   from	   the	   empirical	  
observation	  that	  both	  productivity	  and	  employment	  grow	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  with	  higher	  rates	  of	  growth	  
of	  output	  owing	  to	  increasing	  returns,	  known	  as	  Verdoorn’s	  Law.	  Whilst	  the	  greatest	  scope	  of	  scale	  
economies	  lie	  in	  manufacturing,	  Verdoorn’s	  relationship	  is	  applicable	  to	  industry,	  and	  the	  economy,	  
as	  a	  whole	  since	  increasing	  economies	  originate,	   in	  part,	  through	  the	  interdependency	  (in	  terms	  of	  
supply	   and	  demand)	   between	  different	   sectors	   of	   the	   economy.	   Theories	   of	   cumulative	   causation	  
conceive	  of	   a	   causal	   link	   between	   increasing	   complexity	   and	   interdependence	  within	   an	   economy	  
and	  the	  growth	  in	  per	  capita	  income	  (Kaldor	  1978).	  The	  expansion	  of	  one	  sector	  has	  a	  positive	  knock	  
on	  effect	  on	  other	  sectors,	  directly	  by	  making	  available	  cheaper	  (and/or	  higher	  quality)	  inputs	  or	  by	  
inducing	   additional	   demand	   for	   the	   output	   of	   other	   sectors,	   and	   indirectly	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   this	  
results	   in	   a	   chain	   reaction	   through	   the	   economy.	   In	   addition	   to	   external	   economies	   that	   arise	  
through	   the	   impact	   on	   demand	   through	   backward	   linkages,	   increased	   economic	   interdependence	  
can	  potentially	  foster	  economies	  of	  agglomeration,	  learning	  by	  doing	  and	  using	  (e.g.	  the	  diffusion	  of	  
technological	   progress	   through	   the	   use	   of	   increasingly	   technologically	   advanced	   inputs),	   and	  
reduced	   information	   and	   transaction	   costs.	   Interdependence	   between	   increases	   in	   demand	   and	  
increases	   in	  supply	  are	  self-­‐reinforcing	  as	   ‘factor	  creation’	   is	  endogenous.	  Dynamic	  efficiency	  gains	  
arise	   from	   increases	   in	  demand	  and	  the	  associated	  expansion	  of	  production	  which	   induces	   further	  
demand	  increases	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  exports	  as	  a	  source	  of	  autonomous	  demand.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  
pace	  of	  capital	  accumulation	  is	  driven	  by	  demand	  rather	  than	  supply.	  
	  
The	   quantitative	   measurement	   of	   interdependencies	   between	   components	   of	   the	   production	  
processes	   as	   backward	   and	   forward	   input-­‐output	   linkages	   was	   proposed	   by	   Hirschman	   (1958).	  
Hirschman,	  in	  line	  with	  other	  cumulative	  causation	  theorists,	  argued	  that	  a	  causal	  link	  runs	  from	  the	  
density	   of	   input-­‐output	   relations	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   an	   economy	   (i.e.	   the	   stronger	   the	   -­‐	   direct	   and	  
indirect	   -­‐	  backward	   linkages	  of	  a	  particular	  sector	   to	  others,	   the	  stronger	   the	  growth	  pull	  effect	  of	  
that	   sector	  on	   the	   rest	  of	   the	  economy).	  Accordingly,	   the	   role	  of	   industrial	  policy	  becomes	  one	  of	  
maximising	  and	  fostering	  domestic	  linkages	  as	  well	  as	  the	  expansion	  of	  exports	  e.g.	  through	  targeted	  
support	   of	   sectors	   with	   the	   highest	   potential	   forward	   and	   backward	   linkages	   as	   well	   as	   well	   as	  
ensuring	  domestic	  capacity	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  inputs/use	  of	  outputs	  from	  key	  sectors.	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   explosive	   growth	   that	   the	   development	   of	   an	   integrated	   industrial	   structure	   can	  
engender,	  the	  theories	  of	  cumulative	  causation	  also	  imply	  an	  industrial	  growth	  path	  that	  is	  inclusive	  
and	  equalizing.	   Equalising	  dynamics	   are	  endogenous,	  built	   into,	   the	   stages	  of	   industrialisation	  and	  
economic	  development	  both	  as	  outcome	  and	  driver	  for	  industrialisation	  in	  a	  cumulative	  and	  causal	  
process.	  	  
	  
Historically,	   industrialisation	   processes	   of	   the	   now	   advanced	   industrial	   and	   successful	   late	  
industrialising	  economies	  of	  East	  Asia	  have	  passed	  through	  consecutive	  ‘stages’	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  capitalism	  where	  the	  growth	  dynamic	  related	  to	  different	  tendencies	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  
across	  society.	  Kaldor	  (1978)	  proposed	  four	  idealised	  stages	  of	  industrial	  development	  that	  differed	  
in	  terms	  of	  which	  manufacturing	  subsector	  constituted	  the	  driver	  for	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  
sources	  of	  demand	  that	  sustained	  this.	  In	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  industrial	  development	  the	  expansion	  
of	   a	   domestic	   wage/consumer	   goods	   sector	   is	   fuelled	   by	   increasing	   domestic	   demand	   associated	  
with	  rising	  wages	  as	   larger	  sections	  of	   the	  population	  are	   incorporated	   into	  the	   labour	   force.	  With	  
import	   substitution,	   the	   increase	   in	   demand	   for	   domestic	   manufacturing	   rises	   faster	   than	   total	  
consumption.	   As	   import	   substitution	   of	   consumer	   goods	   is	   completed,	   rapid	   development	   peters	  
out.	   The	   second	   stage	   sees	   the	   continued	   expansion	   of	   the	   consumer	   goods	   sector	   through	  
increasing	  exports.	  The	   third	   stage	  of	   industrial	  development	   is	  marked	  by	  a	   shift	   in	   the	   industrial	  
structure	  as	  heavy	  industries,	  in	  particular	  capital	  goods	  industries	  serve	  the	  demand	  for	  investment	  
in	  other	  manufacturing	  sectors,	  expand	  rapidly.	  The	  fast	  growth	  rate	  is	  therefore	  associated	  with	  the	  
development	  of	  heavy	  industries	  out	  of	  the	  relation	  to	  growth	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy	  through	  an	  
integrated	  industrial	  structure.	  Kaldor’s	  fourth,	  and	  final,	  stage	  of	  explosive	  growth	  comes	  from	  the	  
fast	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  external	  demand	  for	  the	  products	  of	  heavy	  industries	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  
self-­‐generated	  growth	  of	  demand	  caused	  by	   the	  economy’s	  own	  expansion.	   	  With	  higher	   levels	  of	  
income,	  the	  income	  elasticity	  of	  demand	  for	  manufactures	  falls	  off,	  both	  absolutely	  and	  relative	  to	  
services	  (Kaldor	  1966).	  Once	  export	  demand	  for	  domestic	  manufacturing	  is	  at	  a	  level	  of	  saturation,	  
one	  would	  expect	  a	  manufacturing’s	  share	  of	  total	  output	  to	  level	  off	  and	  decline	  with	  a	  reduction	  in	  
the	  rate	  of	  growth	  of	  productivity	  and	  overall	  growth.	  	  
	  
The	  pattern	  of	  industrial	  development	  outlined	  by	  Kaldor’s	  stages	  conform	  to	  empirical	  observations	  
by	   Kuznets	   (1957),	   Chenery	   and	   Taylor	   (1968),	   Kader	   (1985),	   Syrquin	   and	   Chenery	   (1989)	   and	  
Haraguchi	   and	   Rezonja	   (2010).	   Deindustrialisation	   occurs	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	   exhaustion	   of	  
scale	   economies	   and	   the	   self-­‐reinforcing	   growth	   dynamic	   associated	   with	   the	   development	   of	   a	  
complex,	   integrated	   and	   interdependent	   economy.	   Premature	   deindustrialisation	   is	   therefore	  
implied	  by	  the	  falling	  share	  of	  manufacturing	  to	  GDP	  at	  income	  levels	  lower	  than	  one	  would	  expect	  
from	   an	   economy	   reaching	   subsequent	   stages	   of	   self-­‐reinforcing,	   self-­‐sustaining,	   industrial	  
development.2	  	   	  
	  
The	  growth	  experience	  of	  South	  Korea	  since	  the	  1960s	  has	  been	  exemplary	  of	  ‘Developmental	  State’	  
(DS)	  model	  of	  late-­‐	  or	  catch-­‐up	  industrialisation.	  Whilst	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  developmental	  state	  both	  as	  
a	   replicable	   model	   for	   catch-­‐up	   industrialisation	   and	   as	   an	   analytical	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	  
industrialisation	  processes	  of	  the	  newly	  industrialised	  economies	  is	  debatable,	  rapid	  industrialisation	  
and	   economic	   growth	   in	   South	   Korea	   has	   occurred	   as	   the	   result	   of	   intensive	   state	   intervention.	  
Within	  four	  decades,	  per	  capital	  income	  rose	  from	  levels	  comparable	  to	  those	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Jalilian	  &	  Weiss	  2000,	  Tregenna	  2011,	  and	  Greenwald	  &	  Stiglitz	  2012	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  (premature)	  deindustrialisation	  of	  
developing	  economies	  especially	  in	  Africa.	  
countries	  in	  the	  1950s	  to	  those	  that	  qualified	  South	  Korea	  for	  high	  income	  country	  status	  in	  the	  late	  
1990s.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Korean	  war,	  textiles	  emerged	  as	  the	  sector	  leading	  (re)industrialisation	  in	  South	  
Korea.	   Growth	   of	   the	   textiles	   sector	   during	   this	   period	  was	   built	   on	   the	   foundation	   of	   large-­‐scale	  
textile	  plants	  left	  by	  Japanese	  colonialism	  and	  financed	  with	  American	  and	  local	  capital	  (McNamara	  
1992).	  The	  1960s	  saw	  the	  sector	   insulated,	   through	  trade	  protection,	   from	  private	   foreign	   imports	  
and	   direct	   foreign	   investments.	   The	   broad	   set	   of	   strategies	   for	   the	   promotion	   of	   industrial	  
development	  identified	  with	  the	  DS-­‐model	  began	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  first	  of	  a	  series	  of	  five	  
year	   plan	   (FYP)	   (1962-­‐1966)	   by	   the	   Second	  Republic.	   At	   the	   centre	   of	   state	   strategy	   for	   industrial	  
development	  was	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘industrial	  upgrading’	  informed	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  economy	  should	  
be	   self-­‐sufficient	   –	   reduce	   reliance	   on	   foreign	   investment	   to	   fill	   the	   investment	   savings	   gap	   and	  
capital	  and	  intermediate	  inputs	  into	  domestic	  manufacturing	  (Chang	  1993).	  Cement,	  fertiliser	  and	  oil	  
refining	  were	   selected	  as	  priority	   sectors	   in	   the	   first	   FYP.	   The	   second	  FYP	   saw	  chemical,	   steel	   and	  
machinery	  receiving	  a	  broad	  gambit	  of	  state	  support	  as	  priority	  sectors	  aimed	  at	  solving	  balance	  of	  
payments	   issues	   arising	   from	   the	   reliance	   upon	   capital	   goods	   imports	   (ibid).	   Priority	   sectors	  
identified	   in	   the	   first	   and	   second	   FYPs	   depended,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   on	   demand	   from	  domestic	  
sectors	   and	  were	   thus	   tied	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   economy	   as	   a	  whole.	   The	   third	   and	   fourth	   FYPs	  
(1972-­‐1981)	   saw	   the	  continued	   focus	  on	  promoting	  heavy	   industries	   (non-­‐ferrous	  metals	  and	   ship	  
building)	  and	  the	  addition	  of	  electronics	  (ibid).	  The	  fifth	  and	  sixth	  FYPs	  saw	  a	  new	  focus	  on	  high-­‐tech	  
and	   high-­‐value	   added	   manufacturing	   sectors	   (machinery,	   electronics,	   automobile,	   chemical,	  
shipbuilding,	  and	  various	  high-­‐tech	   industries	  such	  as	  semiconductors	  and	  biotechnology)	  (ibid).	  At	  
the	  core	  of	  the	  successive	  FYPs	  and	  the	  Industrial	  Development	  Law	  (IDL)	  of	  1986	  that	  followed	  was	  
the	   vision	   of	   an	   integrated	   industrial	   structure	   through	   the	   promotion	   of	   high-­‐value	   added,	  
competitive	  industries	  linked	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  the	  managed	  contraction	  and	  phasing	  
out	   of	   ‘declining’	   sectors.	   In	   this	  way,	   textiles	   and	  dyeing	   industries	   received	   government	   support	  
from	  1979	   through	  direct	   subsidies	   for	   the	   scrapping	   of	   old	  machines	   and	   the	   installation	   of	   new	  
ones	  based	  on	  the	  assessment	   that	   the	  sector	  was	  at	  a	  satisfactory	   level	   in	   terms	  of	   technological	  
capabilities	  but	  constrained	  by	  old	  capital	  stock.	  (Chang	  1993)	  
	  
The	  evolving	  state	  strategy	   for	   industrial	  development	   in	  South	  Korea	  thus	  conforms	  to	  the	  stages	  
put	   forward	   by	   Kaldor,	   with	   its	   foundation	   in	   the	   consumer	   goods	   sector,	   followed	   by	   upstream	  
diversification	   into	   intermediate	   input	   and	   capital	   goods	   sectors	   and	   then	   high-­‐value,	   high-­‐tech	  
sectors,	   with	   the	   outcome	   of	   an	   integrated	   industrial	   structure	   that	   largely	   self-­‐reinforcing.	   In	  
contrast	  to	  South	  Africa,	  the	  focus	  of	  state	  policy	  on	  heavy	  industries	  in	  South	  Korea	  did	  not	  occur	  at	  
the	  expense	  of,	  or	  act	  to	  undermine,	  rapid	  growth	  in	  light	  manufacturing.	  The	  result	  of	  developing	  a	  
diversified	  and	  integrated	  industrial	  structure	  has	  been	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  without	  a	  worsening	  
of	   income	  distribution	   in	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s.	  Rapid	  growth	   in	   light	  manufacturing	   improved	   the	  
position	  of	  low-­‐skilled	  workers	  whilst	  the	  expansion	  of	  heavy	  industry	  drove	  growth	  in	  the	  economy	  
and	  high	  rates	  of	  employment,	  South	  Korea	  thus	  saw	  an	  overall	   improvement	  in	   income	  inequality	  
as	  measured	  by	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  falling	  from	  0.33	  in	  1980	  to	  0.28	  in	  1997	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  
significant	  state	  policy	  for	  redistribution.	  
	  
Theories	  of	  cumulative	  causation	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  South	  Korea	  and	  other	  developmental	  states	  
thus	   inform	   state	   intervention	   and	   strategy	   that	   is	   both	   pervasive	   and	   evolving.	   The	   causal	  
significance	  of	   industrialisation,	  as	  the	  development	  of	  an	   integrated,	   interdependent	  and	  evolving	  
industrial	  structure	  driven	  by	  demand,	  in	  rapid	  and	  inclusive	  industrial	  development,	  informed	  by	  a	  
macro	  conceptualization	  of	  capital	  accumulation,	   thus	  emphasises	   the	  centrality	  of	   the	   role	  of	   the	  
state	   in	   directing	   industrialisation.	   Industrial	   policy	   thus	   involves	   a	   complementary	   gamut	   of	  
instruments	   and	   tools	   at	   the	  macro	  and	  micro	   level	   that	   involves	   state	  direction	  of	   investment	   as	  
well	  as	  private	  sector	  support.	  The	  development	  of	  competitive	  industries	  forms	  an	  important	  part	  
of	   industrial	   strategy,	   in	   contrast	   to	   industrial	   policy	   informed	   by	   ‘new	   structural	   economics’,	  
industrial	  cluster	   research	   informed	  by	   ‘new	  economic	  geography’,	  or	   ‘global	  value	  chain	  analysis’,	  
that	   will	   discussed	   in	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   paper,	   that	   equate	   industrialisation	   with	   the	  
development	  of	  competitiveness	  or	  ‘competitive	  advantage’	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  
	  
3. 	  Industrial	  Policy	  and	  the	  New	  Structural	  Economics	  
	  
Though	  questions	  around	  how	  industries	  develop	  are	  not	  new,	  the	  notion	  of	  industrial	  policy	  was	  for	  
much	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s	  off	  the	  agenda	  of	  international	  financial	  institutions.3	  Though	  building	  
on	   the	   misleading	   government	   or	   market	   failure	   debate	   that	   precedes	   it,	   Lin’s	   New	   Structural	  
Economics	  (NSE)	  hails	  itself	  as	  a	  third	  way	  of	  economic	  development	  thinking	  by	  returning	  the	  focus	  
of	   the	   mainstream	   debate	   to	   the	   role	   and	   conceptualisation	   of	   industrial	   policy.4	   This	   section	  
explores	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  NSE	  has	  reformulated	  the	  industrial	  policy	  debate	  by	  reinforcing	  the	  
notion	   of	   static	   factor	   endowments,	   a	   peculiar	   understanding	   of	   dynamic	   industrial	   development	  
based	   on	   upgrading,	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   (latent)	   comparative	   advantage	   framework.	   This	  
reformulation	  reinforces	  a	  number	  of	  restrictions	  for	  industrial	  development	  strategies	  as	  well	  as	  for	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  state;	  confining	  them	  to	  a	  market-­‐facilitating	  role	  within	  the	  space	  created	  by	  market	  
imperfections	   as	   per	   the	   information	   theoretic	   approach.	   This	   is	   in	   stark	   contrast	   with	   industrial	  
structure	   and	   strategies	   informed	   by	   theories	   of	   cumulative	   causation	   within	   a	   diversified	   and	  
interdependent	   industrial	   structure,	   and	   presents	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   for	   alternative	   debates	  
and	  formulation	  of	  industrial	  policy.	  
	  
NSE	   defines	   industrial	   structure	   through	   factor	   endowments,	   but	   builds	   on	   the	   notions	   of	  
comparative	  advantage,	  defined	  by	  static	  factor	  endowments,	  by	  allowing	  for	  factor	  endowments	  to	  
change	  over	  time	  through	  upgrading	  from	  more	  labour	  and	  resource-­‐intensive	  endowment	  structure	  
to	   one	   characterised	   by	   abundant	   capital.5	   	   This	   accumulation	   of	   capital	   and	   upgrading	   relies	   on	  
factor	   prices	   that	   reflect	   the	   factor	   endowments,	   and	   consequently	   a	   “well-­‐functioning	   market	  
…(as)…	  the	  basic	  institution	  of	  the	  economy”.	  (Lin	  2012,	  p.6)	  	  The	  NSE	  thus	  remains	  firmly	  rooted	  in	  
orthodox	   assumptions	   and	  mechanisms	   based	   on	  methodological	   individualism,	   the	   supremacy	   of	  
the	  price	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  sectors	  and	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  settings	  they	  
operate	  in.	  The	  framework	  is	  selective	  and	  narrows	  in	  on	  firm	  or	  sector	  activities,	  dynamic	  shifts	  are	  
possible	   as	   movement	   within	   value	   chains	   from	   one	   static	   endowment	   state	   to	   another,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  And	  as	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  programmes,	  off	  the	  agenda	  for	  countries	  in	  receipt	  of	  IMF	  or	  World	  Bank	  
assistance.	  See	  for	  example	  Chang	  (2012,	  p.1)	  noting	  the	  change	  in	  the	  reading	  of	  evidence	  on	  industrial	  policy,	  revival	  of	  the	  infant	  
industry	  argument	  in	  various	  guises,	  and	  increasing	  acceptance	  among	  orthodox	  economists	  that	  there	  are	  many	  types	  of	  market	  
failures	  (beyond	  externalities)	  that	  may	  justify	  industrial	  policy.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  the	  on-­‐going	  industrial	  policy	  debate	  within	  
the	  political	  economy	  and	  other	  heterodox	  traditions.	  See	  for	  example	  seminal	  contributions	  by	  Amsden	  (1989),	  Wade	  (1990)	  and	  
more	  recently,	  Chang	  (2002),	  Soludo	  et	  al	  (2004),	  Ul	  Haque	  (2007)	  and	  Reinert	  (2007),	  Singh	  (2011).	  In	  contrast,	  though	  their	  
contributions	  to	  the	  debate	  are	  important,	  the	  Harvard	  group	  writing	  on	  industrial	  policy	  remains	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  market	  
failure.	  See	  for	  example	  Rodrik	  (2006,	  2007)	  Hausmann,	  Rodrik,	  Sabel	  (2008).	  
4	  The	  limited	  space	  within	  the	  IFI-­‐dominated	  orthodox	  discourse	  for	  industrial	  policy	  was	  confined	  to	  a	  case	  of	  market	  failure	  
arising	  from	  information	  or	  coordination	  imperfections	  and	  transactions	  costs	  drawing	  on	  microeconomics	  traditions.	  For	  example	  
Pack	  &	  Saggi	  (2006)	  discuss	  three	  potential	  arguments	  that	  could	  justify	  industrial	  policy	  as:	  coordination	  failure,	  knowledge	  
spillovers,	  Informational	  externalities.	  They	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  some	  scope	  for	  what	  they	  term	  ‘new	  industrial	  policies’	  based	  on	  
agglomeration	  effects	  and	  industrial	  clusters.	  However,	  they	  find	  limited	  evidence	  that	  intervention	  with	  the	  market	  mechanisms	  
produced	  spillovers	  into	  other	  sectors	  and	  conclude	  in	  favour	  of	  competitive	  and	  efficient	  markets,	  thus	  relegating	  industrial	  policy	  
to	  a	  special	  ideological	  case	  of	  market	  failure.	  
“According	  to	  us,	  industrial	  policy	  is	  basically	  any	  type	  of	  selective	  intervention	  or	  government	  policy	  that	  attempts	  to	  alter	  the	  
structure	  of	  production	  toward	  sectors	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  offer	  better	  prospects	  for	  economic	  growth	  than	  would	  occur	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  such	  intervention,	  i.e.,	  in	  the	  market	  equilibrium.”	  (Pack	  &	  Saggi	  2006,	  p.	  2)	  
Likewise,	  in	  a	  collection	  of	  papers,	  messieurs	  Rodrik	  ,	  Hausmann	  et	  al	  explore	  specific	  aspects	  of	  industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  market	  
failures	  that	  act	  as	  impediments	  to	  structural	  transformation.	  Here	  structural	  transformation	  is	  conceived	  as	  a	  change	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  
exports	  that	  occurs	  as	  countries	  develop	  and	  upgrade	  their	  product	  offering	  and	  thus	  their	  endowment.	  	  
5	  “(The	  NSE)	  postulates	  that	  the	  economic	  structure	  of	  an	  economy	  is	  endogenous	  to	  its	  factor	  endowment	  structure	  and	  that	  sustained	  
economic	  development	  is	  driven	  by	  changes	  in	  factor	  endowments	  and	  continuous	  technological	  innovation.”	  (Lin	  2012,	  pp.5-­‐6).	  
Upgrading	  is	  seen	  in	  specific	  terms	  as:	  technological	  innovations,	  infrastructure	  improvements	  or	  other	  sources	  of	  value	  added	  such	  as	  
learning	  or	  productivity	  improvements.	  
diversification	   is	   contained	   within	   vertically	   specialised	   chains	   –	   creating	   the	   space	   for	  
industrialisation	   strategies	   such	   as	   the	   global	   value-­‐chain	   development,	   vertical	   specialisation,	   or	  
resource-­‐led	  industrialisation	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  analytical	  foundations	  of	  NSE.	  
	  
Within	   this	   form	   of	   discourse,	   industrial	   policy	   is	   increasingly	   viewed	   as	   necessary	   for	   industrial	  
upgrading,	  although	  views	  differ	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  policy	  supports	   latent	  but	  existing	  comparative	  
advantage	  or	  the	  development	  of	  entirely	  new	  industries	  that	  deviate	  from	  comparative	  advantage	  
(Lin	   and	   Chang	   2009).6	   Depending	   on	   whether	   the	   focus	   is	   market	   access,	   productivity	   or	  
competitiveness	   improvements,	   or	  movement	  within	   a	   value	   chain,	   upgrading	   can	   take	   place,	   for	  
example,	   through	   technology	   or	   skills	   acquisition,	   through	   a	   focus	   on	   costs	   or	   other	   production	  
prices,	   or	   address	   inter-­‐firm	   information	   or	   coordination	   problems	   through	   agglomeration	   or	  
clusters,	  or	  as	  movement	  or	  capture	  of	  gains	  (through	  vertical	  specialisation)	  within	  a	  value	  chain.	  	  
	  
The	  revived	  industrial	  policy	  debate	  as	  reformulated	  by	  the	  NSE	  reproduces	  a	  number	  of	  limitations	  
of	  neoliberal	  microeconomics.	  Firstly,	   it	  returns	  to	  earlier	  futile	  attempts	  to	  define	   industrial	  policy	  
to	   include	   both	   broad	   and	   specific	   aims	   (distribution,	   growth,	   sector	   or	   industry	   enabling	   or	  
promotion,	   structural	   change	   education,	   infrastructure,	   export	   development	   but	   also	   supporting	  
development	   of	   technology	   and	   learning,	   reducing	   specific	   input	   costs	   or	   improving	   productivity),	  
without	   interrogating	   the	   particular	   context	   or	   the	  mechanisms	   behind	   the	   accumulation	   and	   the	  
shift	  from	  one	  endowment	  structure	  to	  another.7	  Second,	  it	  relies	  on	  an	  implicit	  notion	  that	  a	  static	  
snapshot	   in	   the	  micro	   context	   can	   represent	   the	   continuous,	   complex,	   historically	   rooted	   change	  
that	   industrialisation	  entails	   in	  the	  macro	  (in	  structure,	   influential	  forces	  and	  agents,	  prices,	  nature	  
of	  production	  and	  products,	  linkages	  between	  industrial	  activities	  or	  markets	  etc.).8	  Third,	  it	  relies	  on	  
an	   assumption	   that	   a	   policy	   can	   be	   targeted	   or	   selective	  whether	   by	   sector	   or	   discrete	   economic	  
constraint.	  In	  other	  words	  it	  suggests	  some	  kind	  of	  universal	  categorisation	  of	  the	  economic	  activity	  
is	   possible,	   that	   this	   is	   adequately	   reflected	   by	   (factor)	   prices,	   that	   a	   single	   preferable	   path	   of	  
development	  (upgrading)	  can	  be	  identified,	  and	  a	  suitable	  policy	  (e.g.	  technology	  or	  innovation)	  can	  
be	  identified	  and	  implemented.9	  Fourth,	  this	  implies	  a	  gross	  reduction	  in	  both	  the	  understanding	  and	  
evolution	   of	   diversified	   and	   causally	   linked	   industrial	   activities	   and	   is	   in	   contrast	   to	   perspectives	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  A	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  historical	  and	  evolving	  debate	  on	  industrial	  policy	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  A	  more	  detailed	  
discussion,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  industrial/firm	  upgrading	  covering	  technology,	  learning,	  and	  other	  costs	  and	  constraints	  to	  the	  quality	  
speed	  and	  scale	  of	  supply	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Lall	  (2000,2003),	  Humphrey	  and	  Schmitz	  (2001).	  	  An	  overview	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  industrial	  
policy	  in	  South	  Africa	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  contribution	  by	  Zalk	  (2012),	  and	  the	  Ashman	  and	  Cattaneo	  to	  the	  PERSA	  industrial	  policy	  cluster.	  
7	  This	  is	  visible	  in,	  for	  example,	  in	  Warwick	  (2013	  OECD	  Science,	  Technology	  and	  Industry	  Policy	  Paper)	  who	  presents	  a	  selective	  review	  of	  
how	  the	  industrial	  policy	  literature	  ranges	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  definitions	  and	  objectives.	  Though	  identifying	  the	  limitations	  of	  multiple	  
definitions	  and	  a	  broad	  target,	  Warwick	  (2013)	  nevertheless	  attempts	  a	  synthesis	  that	  combines	  both	  the	  broad	  and	  the	  specific	  aspects	  of	  
industrial	  policy.	  
	  
“Industrial	  Policy	  is	  any	  type	  of	  intervention	  or	  government	  policy	  that	  attempts	  to	  improve	  the	  business	  environment	  or	  to	  alter	  the	  
structure	  of	  economic	  activity	  toward	  sectors,	  technologies	  or	  tasks	  that	  are	  expected	  to	  offer	  better	  prospects	  for	  economic	  growth	  or	  
societal	  welfare	  than	  would	  occur	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  intervention.”	  (Warwick	  (2013,	  p.16)	  
	  
This	  quote	  characterises	  not	  just	  the	  limitations	  of	  attempting	  a	  unified	  definition	  of	  industrial	  policy,	  but	  the	  dangers	  in	  the	  associated	  
thinking	  that	  a	  clearly	  definable	  policy	  can	  be	  identified	  to	  address	  industrial	  constraints.	  This	  implies	  that	  economic	  activities	  can	  be	  
clearly	  separated	  and	  delineated	  in	  order	  for	  a	  targeted	  policy	  to	  be	  identified.	  It	  also	  makes	  implicit	  assumptions	  about	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  
separation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  government	  or	  policy	  from	  other	  (market)	  forces	  that	  affect	  industry.	  A	  quote	  from	  Lall	  &	  Wangwe	  (1998,	  
p.72)	  makes	  a	  similar	  point	  about	  diverting	  resources	  away	  from	  the	  allocation	  of	  market	  forces	  –	  bringing	  to	  question	  whether	  this	  
renewed	  debate	  is	  in	  fact	  recycling	  old	  theory.	  
8	  In	  contrast,	  Naude	  &	  Szirmai	  (2013,	  p.2	  note	  that	  	  “(i)	  industrialization	  is	  not	  an	  automatic	  process	  –	  history,	  policies	  and	  luck	  matter;	  and	  
(ii)	  that	  very	  different	  types	  of	  industrial	  policies	  are	  necessary	  in	  different	  contexts	  and	  different	  times.”	  	  
9	  The	  sectors,	  functions	  or	  segments	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  underlying	  tensions	  or	  failure	  in	  markets	  (e.g.	  externalities,	  
information	  imperfections,	  missing	  or	  incomplete	  markets).	  Sectors	  are	  treated	  as	  identical	  with	  no	  differentiation	  for	  example	  through	  
increasing	  returns	  to	  scale	  or	  implications	  for	  employment	  generation,	  or	  demand	  linkages	  (such	  as	  through	  wages-­‐led	  consumption	  or	  
cross	  sector	  demand).	  	  Likewise,	  the	  solutions	  to	  these	  constraints	  utilise	  market	  mechanisms,	  either	  in	  supporting	  or	  helping	  develop	  
information	  or	  transaction	  costs	  and	  constraints,	  using	  notions	  of	  price	  and	  optimisation	  to	  both	  capture	  interests	  and	  needs	  of	  industry	  
agents,	  but	  also	  the	  processes	  of	  upgrading	  or	  value	  adding.	  This	  approach	  excludes	  non-­‐economic	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  relations	  within	  or	  
between	  industries,	  but	  also	  the	  social	  implications	  of	  industrialisation	  processes	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  classical	  political	  economy	  (e.g.	  
redistribution	  of	  income	  or	  reducing	  inequality	  through	  employment).	  
highlighting	  the	  variation	  of	   industrial	  development	  (across	  sectors	  but	  also	  political	  and	  economic	  
settings),	   and	   the	   nature	   and	   emergence	   of	   particular	   linkages	   between	   industrial	   activities.10	  
Diversification	  is	  seen	  akin	  to	  a	  portfolio	  tool,	  either	  as	  the	  result	  of	  selective	  promotion	  of	  activities	  
that	  represent	  key	  bottlenecks	  (market	  imperfections),	  a	  source	  of	  upgrading	  by	  capturing	  a	  greater	  
portion	   of	   a	   value	   chain	   or	   shifting	   into	   higher	   value	   added	   activities	   as	   directed	   by	   vertical	  
specialisation.	  This	  ignores	  the	  important	  empirical	  work	  done	  by	  Imbs	  &Wacziarg	  (2003)	  on	  finding	  
evidence	   for	   a	   U-­‐shaped	   relationship	   between	   growth	   and	   diversification	   in	   alignment	   with	  
Rosenstein-­‐Rodan’s	   (1943)	   insights	   about	   simultaneous	   industrialisation	   across	   multiple	   sectors.	  
Fifth,	  a	  very	  peculiar	  relationship	  between	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  state	  and	  market	  is	  promoted.	  The	  role	  of	  
the	  state	   is	  to	  merely	  facilitate	  or	  correct	  (not	  defy)	  market	   imperfections	  or	  bottlenecks	  that	  may	  
occur	   at	   the	   firm	   level	   or	   a	   specific	   segment	   of	   a	   particular	   value	   chain.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  
maintains	   the	   importance	   of	   state	   intervention	   to	   create	   or	   assist	   (firms	   and	   industries)	   in	   the	  
exploitation	  and	  upgrading	  of	  comparative	  advantage	  through	  national	  innovation	  systems,	  support	  
for	  entry	  into	  or	  upgrading	  within	  global	  value	  chains,	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  and	  start-­‐
ups	   with	   the	   focus	   on	   what	   Naude	   &	   Szirmai	   (2013,	   p.5)	   see	   as	   a	   more	   “nuanced	   partnership	  
between	   entrepreneurs	   and	   the	   state”.	   The	   NSE	   continues	   the	   contradictions	   arising	   from	   the	  
support	   from	   a	   selectively	   interventionist	   state	   for	   a	   free	   market	   within	   the	   framework	   of	  
institutional	   and	   information	   imperfections	   driven	   by	   (a	   search	   or	   need	   to	   enhance)	   comparative	  
advantage.	   This	   selective,	   static,	   market-­‐led	   approach	   constrains	   policy	   to	   identifying	   ways	   to	  
upgrade	  in	  the	  face	  of	  market	  imperfections	  in	  the	  short-­‐run.	  	  In	  the	  long-­‐run,	  the	  market	  forces	  and	  
mechanisms	  are	   assumed	   to	  operate	  perfectly.	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  policy	   space	  being	  enabled	  by	   the	  
NSE	  does	  not	  seek	  to	  develop	  knowledge,	  demand	  or	  other	  types	  of	  cumulative	  linkages	  or	  to	  foster	  
the	   broad-­‐based	   diversification	   of	   different	   economic	   activities	   which	   would	   enable	   an	   industrial	  
structure	   that	   would	   both	   incorporate	   social	   objectives	   or	   generate	   a	   cumulative	   self-­‐reinforcing	  
cycle	  of	  growth	  across	  diversified	  sectors	  as	  was	  understood	  by	  (original)	  structuralism.	  11	  	  
	  
Why	  does	  this	  matter?	  The	  NSE	  presents	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  structuralism,	  which	  it	  attempts	  
to	  marry	  with	  neoclassical	  approaches	  to	  industrialisation,	  with	  adverse	  implications	  for	  both	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   ensuing	   policy	   debate.12	   As	   detailed	   by	   Fine	   &	   Waeyenberge	   (2013,	   p.19),	   awareness	   or	  
contributions	  of	  earlier	  notions	  of	  structuralism	  have	  neatly	  been	  done	  away	  with.	  Structuralism	  as	  
understood	  by	  NSE	  has	  shifted	  from	  Lin’s	  earlier	  focus	  on	  “factor	  endowments,	  prices,	  capital-­‐labour	  
intensities	   and	   the	   composition	   of	   output”	   to	   one	   of	   “structural	   transformation	   …	   (seen	   as)	   a	  
continuous	   shift	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   production	   in	   directions	   dictated	   by	   latent	   comparative	  
advantage”	   (Fine	   &	   Waeyenberge	   2013,	   p.7).	   The	   NSE	   proclaiming	   itself	   as	   a	   ‘third	   way’	   is	   an	  
attempt	   to	   establish	   a	   new	   base	   for	   subsequent	   industrialisation	   strategies	   and	   debates,	   and	   to	  
ground	   these	   in	   the	   comparative	   advantage	   framework.	   This	   reductionism	   is	   visible	   within	   the	  
literature	  on	  GVC,	  VSI	  or	  Resource-­‐led	  industrialisation,	  (as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  section),	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Naude	  &	  Szirmai	  (2013)	  showcase	  the	  contradictory	  and	  misleading	  framing	  of	  the	  industrial	  policy	  debate	  as	  two	  opposing	  views	  
termed	  neoliberal	  and	  neo-­‐structuralist.	  Though	  both	  are	  set	  in	  the	  comparative	  advantage	  framework,	  the	  former	  is	  defined	  as	  being	  
critical	  of	  inward	  looking	  (orthodox)	  industrial	  policy	  supporting	  comparative	  advantage	  (alternative	  or	  heterodox	  views	  on	  industrial	  
policy	  are	  ignored),	  the	  latter	  narrowly	  defined	  as	  a	  revival	  of	  import-­‐substitution	  industrialisation	  (ISI),	  infant	  industry	  protection	  in	  
response	  to	  failures	  of	  market	  liberalisation,	  and	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  They	  continue	  this	  contradiction	  with	  a	  characterization	  of	  
China’s	  industrial	  success	  arguably	  based	  on	  trial,	  error	  and	  accidents	  associated	  with	  great	  social	  costs,	  implying	  industrial	  policy	  has	  a	  
darker	  side	  to	  be	  wary	  of,	  yet	  they	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  carefully	  craft	  and	  situate	  industrial	  policies	  to	  address	  the	  (new	  
industrial	  policy)	  needs	  of	  centred	  around	  enterprises	  rather	  than	  states	  for	  learning,	  self-­‐discovery	  and	  experimentation.	  
11	  This	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  terminology	  that	  has	  become	  standard	  in	  mainstream	  industrialisation	  debates.	  For	  example,	  competitiveness,	  
productivity,	  capabilities	  (both	  production	  and	  policy),	  upgrading,	  innovation,	  beneficiation,	  are	  used	  to	  identify	  and	  sources	  of	  
comparative	  advantage	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time	  without	  consideration	  for	  how	  the	  given	  endowment	  structure	  came	  to	  be	  at	  or	  how	  it	  
might	  be	  altered.	  	  
12	  As	  Rodrik	  (2011,	  p.229)	  suggests:	  “a	  deeper	  question	  relates	  to	  the	  policy	  implications	  one	  draws	  from	  all	  this.	  In	  principle,	  market	  
failures	  need	  to	  be	  addressed	  with	  appropriately	  targeted	  policies.	  So	  if	  the	  problem	  is	  one	  of	  information	  spillovers,	  the	  first-­‐best	  is	  to	  
subsidize	  the	  information	  generating	  process.	  If	  the	  problem	  is	  lack	  of	  coordination,	  the	  first-­‐best	  is	  for	  the	  government	  to	  bring	  the	  
parties	  together	  and	  coordinate	  their	  investments.	  In	  practice,	  though,	  the	  relevant	  market	  failures	  cannot	  be	  always	  closely	  identified	  and	  
the	  directly	  targeted	  remedies	  may	  not	  be	  available.	  The	  practical	  reality	  is	  that	  the	  type	  of	  policies	  structuralism	  calls	  for—whether	  of	  the	  
traditional	  or	  the	  contemporary	  type—have	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  a	  second-­‐best	  setting.	  And	  in	  such	  a	  setting,	  nothing	  is	  all	  that	  straightforward	  
anymore.”	  
also	   in	   how	   the	   NSE	   reproduces	   select	   aspects	   of	   the	   information	   theoretic	   approach.13	   The	   NSE	  
draws	  on	  the	  information	  theoretic	  approach	  to	  provide	  the	  justification	  for	  a	  facilitating	  state,	  not	  
for	  a	  better	  incorporation	  of	  the	  non-­‐economic	  dimensions	  and	  forces	  that	  shape	  these	  market	  and	  
institutional	  imperfections.14	  Like	  the	  ITA,	  the	  NSE	  also	  fails	  to	  interrogate	  how	  these	  imperfections	  
or	   missing	   markets	   have	   emerged,	   let	   alone	   raise	   questions	   about	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   market	  
mechanisms.15	  	  
	  
In	  sum,	  what	  the	  ‘new’	  industrial	  policy	  means	  for	  (understanding)	  industrialisation	  is	  a	  reliance	  on	  
static	   comparative	   advantage	   determined	   by	   endowments	   that	   cannot	   be	   altered.	   Attempts	   to	  
extract	   greater	   value	   from	   fixed	   endowments	   in	   a	   globally	   connected	   world	   lead	   to	   notions	   of	  
improving	   competitiveness	   and	   productivity.	   The	   connections	   are	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   market	  
activities	  (trade	  for	  inputs	  and	  outputs,	  costs	  associated	  with	  infrastructure	  or	  market	  rigidities	  such	  
as	  trade	  protection)	  and	  market	  entities	  (enterprises,	  value	  or	  production	  chains,	  trade	  in	  inputs	  and	  
outputs).	  The	  (microeconomic)	  mechanisms	  of	  optimisation	  of	  inputs	  and	  maximisation	  of	  profits	  for	  
individual	  firms	  are	  determined	  by	  price	  (or	  cost).	  Competitive	  parity	  or	  advantage	  can	  be	  achieved	  
through	   technology,	   learning,	   innovation,	   removal	   of	   constraints	   to	   market	   actions,	   with	  
assumptions	   of	   universality	   and	   homogeneity	   permeating	   the	   thinking	   at	   multiple	   levels.	   These	  
innovations,	   improvements,	   addressing	   of	   market	   weaknesses	   are	   measured	   through	   the	   ability	  
(capacity	  and	  capability)	  to	   increase	  value	  added	  and	  upgrade	  in	  particular	   in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  
value	  chains.	  The	  state	   is	  considered	  benevolent	  and	   facilitating	  at	  best,	  or	  a	  source	  of	  short-­‐term	  
correction	   of	   market	   failures,	   at	   worst,	   government	   failure	   in	   the	   forms	   of	   weak	   institutions,	  
governance	   problems	   promote	   an	   environment	   of	   rent-­‐capture.	   	   The	   focus	   is	   firmly	   on	   the	  
enterprise,	   seen	   as	   a	   component	   in	   global	   value	   chains,	   and	   not	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   broad-­‐based,	  
causally	  significant	  and	  cumulative	  linkages	  across	  multiple	  firms,	  activities,	  sectors,	  industries.	  
	  
These	   limitations	   not	   only	   challenge	   a	   broader	   understanding	   of	   the	   role	   of	   industrial	   policy	   and	  
industrialisation	  processes,	  but	  also	  fail	   to	  question	  the	  core	  notion	  of	  comparative	  advantage	  and	  
the	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  homogenous	  market	  structures	  and	  mechanisms.	  Though	  the	  NSE	  hails	  itself	  as	  
the	   third	   way	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   preceding	   debate	   between	   market	   or	   government	   failure,	   the	  
assumptions	   and	   mechanisms	   portrayed	   as	   ‘new’	   instead	   reinforce	   neoclassical	   notions	   of	   factor	  
endowments,	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	   market,	   and	   a	   particular	   conceptualisation	   of	   industrial	  
transformation	   and	   structure.	   Thus,	   whilst	   reviving	   industrial	   policy	   in	   the	   mainstream,	   the	   NSE	  
constrains	   the	   space	   for	   debate	   across	   a	   number	   of	   theoretical	   and	   policy	   spheres,	   with	   severe	  
implications	   for	   alternative	   approaches	   (theoretical,	   policy,	   methodological),	   and	   alternative	  
conceptualisations	   of	   the	   roles	   of	   different	   agents	   and	   institutions	   based	   on	   notions	   of	  
heterogeneity	  of	  context,	  history	  and	  processes.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  As	  McCullough	  notes	  in	  the	  blog,	  devpolicy.org,	  this	  is	  old	  wine	  in	  new	  bottles.	  
14	  This	  marginalises	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐economic	  structures	  and	  institutions	  and	  ignores	  the	  notion	  that	  industrial	  development	  is	  set	  in	  a	  
particular	  social	  and	  structural	  context.	  This	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  way	  the	  literature	  on	  industrial	  ‘upgrading’	  discusses	  improving	  capacities	  
(physical	  skills/attributes/technology)	  and	  capabilities	  (ability	  to	  use	  capacity)	  and	  innovation.	  	  The	  underlying	  notion	  is	  that	  learning	  in	  
markets	  can	  to	  some	  extent	  be	  complemented	  through	  improved	  education,	  which	  in	  many	  cases	  is	  supplied	  or	  supported	  by	  the	  state.	  
Yet	  as	  Soludo,	  Ogbu	  &	  Chang	  (2004)	  note,	  there	  are	  behavioural	  and	  institutional	  characteristics	  that	  influence	  this	  learning.	  Capabilities	  
are	  firm-­‐specific	  with	  no	  predictable	  learning	  curves	  identical	  to	  all	  firms,	  capabilities	  cannot	  necessarily	  be	  easily	  transferred,	  and	  changes	  
in	  technological	  capability	  do	  not	  equate	  to	  innovation.	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  improved	  capabilities	  can	  generate	  dynamic	  and	  cumulating	  
patterns	  of	  industrialisation	  across	  the	  boundaries	  of	  set	  firms	  or	  sectors	  depends	  heavily	  also	  on	  economic	  but	  also	  social	  structures.	  If	  
cheap	  labour	  exists,	  labour-­‐intensive	  activities	  may	  emerge	  but	  do	  not	  evolve	  into	  more	  complex	  processes	  or	  engender	  technology	  
(innovation)	  even	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  support	  for	  skills	  upgrading,	  learning,	  or	  acquisition	  of	  technology.	  Cultural	  and	  social	  factors	  also	  
influence	  the	  success	  of	  capability	  and	  capacity	  upgrading	  and	  innovation	  yet	  are	  not	  reflected	  in	  the	  industrialisation	  is	  driven	  by	  
comparative	  advantage.	  
15	  In	  particular	  the	  assumptions	  about	  the	  supreme	  ability	  of	  prices	  to	  embody	  information	  (for	  example	  about	  varying	  labour	  
characteristics	  such	  as	  skills),	  or	  to	  explain	  how	  and	  within	  what	  political	  or	  economic	  conditions	  the	  current	  composition	  of	  production	  
and	  factor	  endowments	  emerged	  in.	  
The	  next	   section	  highlights	   these	  challenges	  within	   the	  conjuncture	  of	   the	   industrial	  policy	  debate	  
justified	   by	   neoclassical	   economics,	   and	   theoretical	   frameworks	   around	   industrialisation	   within	   a	  
chain	  construct	  (intra-­‐chain	  upgrading).	  
	  
	  
4. From	   Global	   Value	   Chain	   Development	   to	   Vertical	   Specialisation	   and	   Resource	   Based	  
Industrialisation	  
	  
Global	   Value	   Chain	   Development	   (GVCD)	   as	   a	   strategy	   for	   industrial	   development	   in	   the	  
current	  epoch	  has	  come	  to	   the	   fore	  with	   the	   recent	   re-­‐emergence	  of	   the	   industrial	  policy	  
debate.	   The	   promotion	   of	   GVCD	   in	   the	   context	   of	   sub-­‐Saharan	   Africa	   has	   taken	   an	  
opportunistic	   turn	   towards	   the	   promotion	   of	   value	   chains	   linked	   to	   natural	   resource	  
endowments	   in	   line	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   New	   Structural	   Economics	   as	   intellectual	  
justification	   for	   the	   current	   industrial	   policy	   approach	   of	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   other	  
international	  organisations	  that	  amounts	  to	  state	  support	  for	  the	  promotion	  of	  comparative	  
advantage	  (Morris	  et.	  al.	  2012;	  Fine	  &	  Van	  Waeyenberge	  2012).	  	  
	  
From	  Global	  Value	  Chains….	  
	  
The	  emergence	  of	  GVCD	  as	  a	  strategy	  for	  (industrial)	  development,	  however,	  precedes	  the	  
recent	  return	  to	   industrial	  policy,	  and	  emerges	  directly	  out	  of	  GVC	  analysis.	   	   	  GVC	  analysis	  
constitutes	   a	   strand	   of	   research	   in	   the	   field	   of	   chain	   studies	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   1990s	  
based	   upon	   the	   observation	   that	   globalisation	   of	   production,	   defined	   as	   the	   trend	   in	  
increasing	  international	  dispersion	  of	  production	  activities	  and	  their	  functional	   integration,	  
and	   denoted	   as	   the	   rise	   of	   global	   value	   chains,	   appears	   as	   a	   novel	   and	   characteristic	  
phenomenon	   in	   contemporary	   capitalism	   and	   a	   significant	   shift	   in	   industrialization	   on	   a	  
world	  scale	  (Gereffi	  and	  Korzeniewicz	  1994,	  Dicken	  1998):	  
	  
“Economic	   globalization	   has	   been	   accompanied	   by	   flexible	   specialization,	   or	   the	  
appearance	  of	  new,	  technologically	  dynamic	  forms	  of	  organization…Capitalism	  today	  
thus	   entails	   the	   detailed	   disaggregation	   of	   stages	   of	   production	   and	   consumption	  
across	  national	  boundaries,	  under	  the	  organizational	  structure	  of	  densely	  networked	  
firms	  and	  enterprises”	  (Gereffi	  and	  Koreniewicz	  1994,	  p1)	  
	  
Hopkins	  and	  Wallerstein	  coined	  the	  term	  “commodity	  chain”	  to	  mean	  “a	  network	  of	  labour	  
and	   production	   processes	   whose	   end	   result	   is	   a	   finished	   commodity”	   (Hopkins	   and	  
Wallerstein	   1986,	   p	   159).	   	   Within	   the	   World	   Systems	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   world	  
economy/accumulation	   on	   a	   global	   scale,	   a	   commodity	   chain	   is	   understood	   as	   an	  
intermediate	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  where	  the	  totality	  of	  all	  commodity	  chains	  makes	  up	  the	  world	  
system.	   The	   commodity	   chain	   analysis,	   in	   its	   original	   usage,	   thus	   constitutes	  more	   than	   a	  
simple	   analytical	   tool	   with	   which	   to	   understand	   the	   supply	   and	   demand	   of	   particular	  
products,	  rather,	  the	  chain	  construct	   is	  a	  heuristic	  for	  gaining	  analytical	  purchase	  on	  these	  
structural	   connections,	   the	   study	  of	  which	   illuminates	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	   global	   division	  
and	  integration	  of	  labour	  into	  the	  world	  system	  over	  time	  (Bair	  2008,	  p.437).	  	  
	  
Global	   commodity	   chain	   analysis,	   from	   which	   GVC	   takes	   a	   major	   part	   of	   its	   analytical	  
content	   and	   central	   organising	   concepts,	   emerged	   as	   distinct	   analytical	   approach	   in	   1994	  
with	   the	   publication	   of	   “Commodity	   Chains	   and	   Global	   Capitalism”	   edited	   by	   Gereffi	   and	  
Korzeniewicz.	  The	  book	  launches	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  commodity	  chain	  itself	  as	  ‘global’	  and	  
an	  object	  of	  analysis	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  commodity	  chain	  as	  heuristic	  device	  
deployed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  world	  capitalism	  economy	  of	  world-­‐systems	  
research,	  GCC	   (and	  GVC)	   analysis	   is	   concerned	  with	   analysing	   the	  organisational	   forms	  of	  
contemporary	  global	  industries	  and	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  chains	  themselves	  from	  a	  firm	  
centric	  perspective.	  (Bair	  2008)	  	  
	  
GVC	   analysis	   was	   launched	   in	   2001	   with	   the	   publication	   of	   “Introduction:	   globalisation,	  
value	   chains,	   and	   development”	   in	   the	   IDS	   bulletin,	   authored	   by	   Gereffi,	   Humphrey,	  
Kaplinsky	  &	  Sturgeon16.	  More	  than	  a	  decisive	  change	  in	  nomenclature	  to	  aid	  communication	  
between	   researchers	   across	   multiple	   disciplines,	   where	   “a	   proliferation	   of	   overlapping	  
names	  and	  concepts”	   (Gereffi	  et.	   al	  2001,	  p2)	  had	  arisen,	  GVC	  analysis	   constitutes	  both	  a	  
stream	  within	   chain	   studies	  more	  broadly17	   as	  well	   as	   a	  departure	   in	   terms	  of	   theoretical	  
orientation	   from	   a	   macro-­‐sociological	   (concerned	   with	   analysis	   of	   historical	   and	  
contemporary	  dynamics	  within,	   and	   forms	  of,	   capitalism	  as	  a	   systemic	  whole)	   to	  a	  micro-­‐
oriented	  approach	   that”	   focuses	  on	   the	   coordination	  of	   inter-­‐firm	  dyads	   in	   a	   global	   value	  
chain”	  (Bair	  2008,	  p.339)18.	  In	  this	  way,	  it	  forms	  a	  distinct	  chain	  approach	  as	  the	  study	  of	  the	  
opportunities	  and	  challenges	  faced	  by	  developing	  country	  firms	   in	  terms	  of	  their	  ability	  to	  
capture	  value-­‐added/rents	  through	  processes	  of	  upgrading	  (to	  higher	  value	  added	  activities)	  
in	  relation	  to	  different	  forms	  of	  ‘chain	  governance’.	  
	  
The	   transition	   from	   GCC	   to	   GVC	   involved	   a	   convergence	   between	   the	   conclusions	   on	  
upgrading	  and	  development	  in	  GVC	  analysis	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s	  (and	  GCC	  analysis	  
before	   that)	  and	   those	  drawn	   from	  the	  contemporaneous	   literature	  on	   industrial	   clusters.	  
The	   launch	   of	   GVC	   analysis	   in	   resulted	   from	   the	   coming	   together	   of	   key	   authors	   in	   the	  
respective	   fields	   of	   GVC	   and	   industrial	   cluster	   analyses,	   predominantly	   based	   at	   the	   IDS,	  
Sussex.	  	  This	  saw	  the	  convergence	  in	  theoretical	  content	  between	  GVC	  and	  industrial	  cluster	  
analyses,	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  transaction	  cost	  economics,	  in	  the	  theoretical	  development	  
of	  the	  former19.	  The	  central	  analytical	  concept	  of	  governance,	  defined	  as	  the	  authority	  and	  
power	  relationships	  that	  affect	  how	  resources	  flow	  along	  the	  length	  of	  the	  chain	  by	  Gereffi	  
(1994)	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  a	  narrower	  conception	  of	  governance	  as	  the	  ability	  of	  certain	  
firms	  in	  the	  chain	  to	  coordinate	  activities	  and	  shape	  inter-­‐firm	  relationships	  along	  the	  chain	  
with	   transaction	   costs	   as	   the	   central	   determining	   factor	   affecting	   the	   organisational	   and	  
spatial	  configuration	  of	  a	  chain.	  (Gereffi,	  Humphrey	  &	  Sturgeon	  2005;	  Bair	  2008)	  
	  
The	  policy	  conclusions	  from	  industrial	  cluster	  research	   in	  the	  1990s	  were	  highly	   influential	  
and	   informed	   a	   great	   number	   of	   World	   Bank	   and	   other	   development	   agencies’	   local	  
development	   projects	   and	   programmes.	   Emphasis	   was	   on	   local	   strategies	   for	   firm	  
upgrading:	  selective	  assistance	   for	   local	  enterprise;	   supporting	   local	   institutions	   that	  can	  
work	  towards	  institutionalise	  intra-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐firm	  learning	  processes	  both	  through	  direct	  
links	  with	  firms	  in	  world	  markets	  and	  learning	  processes	  associated	  with	  agglomeration.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Following	  the	  Rockefeller	  Foundation	  funded	  “Global	  Value	  Chains	  Workshop”	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Bellagio,	  Italy,	  25	  September	  –	  1	  
October	  2000.	  
17	  Chain	  studies	  refer	  to	  the	  range	  of	  literature	  that	  deploys	  various	  chain	  conceptions	  to	  the	  empirical	  study	  of	  the	  chain	  of	  activities	  that	  
connect	  production	  to	  consumption	  of	  a	  specific	  commodity.	  	  
18	  See	  Bair	  2005,	  2008	  for	  a	  thorough	  account	  of	  the	  intellectual	  heritage	  and	  developments	  in	  chain	  studies.	  
19	  This	  is	  most	  explicitly	  illustrated	  in	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  IDS	  working	  paper,	  ‘Governance	  and	  Upgrading:	  Linking	  Industrial	  Cluster	  and	  
Global	  Value	  Chain	  Research’,	  by	  Humphrey	  and	  Schmitz	  (2000).	  
Industrial	  cluster	  development,	  and	  later	  GVC	  development,	  served	  as	  an	  acceptable	  form	  of	  
support	  for	   industrialisation	  at	  a	  time	  when	  industrial	  policy	  was	  firmly	  off	  the	  agenda.	  By	  
focussing	   on	   key	   micro-­‐processes	   that	   underpin	   but	   do	   not	   wholly	   constitute	  
industrialisation	  as	  envisaged	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  classical	  political	  economy	  traditions,	  
industrial	  policy	  has	  been	  recast	  entirely	  in	  terms	  of	  local	  level	  support	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  
(e.g.	   support	   for	   SMEs	   and	   entrepreneurial	   development).	   	   In	   turn,	   the	   view	   of	  
industrialisation	  as	  critical	  in	  the	  process	  of	  self-­‐sustaining,	  rapid	  capital	  accumulation	  owing	  
to	  the	  causal	  significance	  of	  industrial	  structure	  in	  economic	  growth	  has	  given	  way	  to	  a	  view	  
of	   industrialisation	   as	   increasing	   shares	   of	   manufacturing	   value	   added	   in	   GDP,	   and	   firm	  
competitiveness	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  	  
	  
By	   defining	   governance	   as	   dyadic	   coordination,	   GVC	   researchers	   have	   been	   “able	   to	  
operationalize	   a	   theory	  of	  GVC	  governance	  –	   that	   is,	   that	   specify	   a	  particular	   relationship	  
between	   a	   set	   of	   independent	   variables	   (industry-­‐level	   characteristics	   of	   the	   value	   chain)	  
and	   the	  dependent	   variable	   (governance	   structure)”	   (Bair	   2008,	   p.353).	   It	   is	   precisely	   this	  
refocus	   away	   from	   forms	   of	   power	   other	   than	   that	   which	   affects	   the	   ability	   to	   explicitly	  
coordinate	  chain	  activities	  and	  influence	  the	  relative	  power	  of	  firm-­‐level	  actors	  in	  the	  chain	  
that	   allows	   GVC	   analysis	   to	   readily	   inform	   development	   strategy.	   By	   scaling	   down	   “the	  
concept	  of	  governance	  from	  a	  characterization	  of	  the	  chain	  in	  its	  entirety	  to	  a	  description	  of	  
the	  mode	  of	  coordination	  prevailing	  at	  a	  particular	  link	  in	  the	  chain”	  (Bair	  2008,	  p.354),	  GVC	  
analysis	   scales	   down	   the	   challenges	   faced	   by	   different	   chain	   actors	   to	   capture	   value	  
added/rents	   through	   upgrading	   as	   well	   as	   the	   role	   of	   the	   state	   becomes	   limited	   to	  
supporting	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  enter	  global	  value	  chains	  and	  upgrade.	  
	  
…to	  Vertically	  Specialised	  Industrial	  Development	  
	  
“The	   growing	   importance	   of	   export-­‐oriented	   industrialisation	   has	   made	   integration	  
into	   the	   global	   economy	   virtually	   synonymous	   with	   development	   for	   a	   number	   of	  
nations.”	  (Gereffi	  et.	  Al.	  2001,	  p1)	  
	  
As	  industrial	  policy	  ceased	  to	  be	  a	  dirty	  word	  outside	  of	  the	  confines	  of	  local	  development,	  
Global	   Value	   Chain	   Development	   has	   become	   explicitly	   linked	   to	   industrialisation	   and	  
industrial	  policy	  by	  its	  key	  theorists/scholars	  as	  well	  as	  international	  organisations.	  Milberg,	  
Jiang	  &	  Gereffi	  (2013),	  in	  a	  recent	  paper	  prepared	  for	  UNCTAD,	  define	  vertical	  specialisation	  
industrialisation	  as	  the	  process	  of	  firm	  “upgrading	  into	  higher	  value	  added	  functions	  within	  
a	  given	  chain	  or	  into	  new	  chains	  that	  generate	  more	  value	  added”	  (p.4).	  	  
	  
An	   apparent	   consensus	   has	   arisen	   around	   the	   imperative	   for	   developing	   countries	   to	  
industrialise	  that	  has	  arisen	  out	  of	  shifts	  in	  production	  and	  trade	  patterns”	  (UNECA	  2013,	  p	  
3),	  namely	  the	  rise	  of	  global	  value	  chains	   in	  the	  organisation	  of	  production,	  and	  the	  direct	  
consequence	   this	   has	   had	   on	   the	   intensification	   of	   competitive	   pressures	   faced	   by	  
developing	  country	  suppliers	  as	  firms	  from	  more	  countries	  enter	  global	  value	  chains.	  Raising	  
competitiveness	   thus	   becomes	   a	   matter	   of	   survival	   for	   developing	   country	   firms	   and	  
industries.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  cumulative	  causality	  scholars	  and	  the	  policy	  makers	  in	  much	  
of	   the	   Third	  World	   during	   the	   post-­‐WWII	   period,	   now	   collectively	   termed	   developmental	  
states,	  where	   rapid	   industrialisation	  seen	   to	  be	  critical	   in	  order	   to	  meet	   the	   imperative	  of	  
rapid	  economic	  growth	  and	  broad	  based	  development	  in	  the	  process	  of	  ‘catch-­‐up’20	  	  	  
	  
As	   in	   GVC	   analysis,	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   heightened	   competition	   offers	   its	   own	  
solution:	   raising	   competitiveness	   and	   developing	   competitive	   advantage	   through	   chain	  
upgrading.	   Industrial	   policy	   recommendations	   coming	   out	   of	   VSI	   thus	   focuses	   “more	   on	  
linkages	  to	  a	  set	  of	  value	  chain	  actors”	  and	  “less	  on	  the	  national	  economy”	  (Milberg.	  et.	  al.	  
2013,	   p4).	   VSI	   informed	   policy	   recommendations	   include	   those	   that	   come	   out	   of	   GVC	   or	  
industrial	   cluster	   research	   and	   emphasise	   a	   policy	   focus	   on	   regulating	   links	   to	   the	   global	  
economy	  through	  trade,	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  and	  exchange	  rate	  policies.	  	  
	  
Where	  GVCD	  and	  industrial	  cluster	  development	  were	  presented	  as	  possible	  paths	  towards	  
(local)	   industrial	   development	   (Naude	   &	   Szirmai	   2011,	   Bigsten	   &	   Söderbom	   2010,	   Zeng	  
2008)),	  VSI	  has	  been	  presented	  by	  Milberg,	  Jiang	  and	  Gereffi	  (2013)	  as	  the	  only	  option	  open	  
to	   developing	   countries	   in	   the	   current	   epoch,	   ‘the	   era	   of	   vertically	   specialized	  
industrialisation’,	   in	   which	   industrial	   development	   strategies	   and	   policies	   of	   the	   past,	  
including	  ISI	  and	  EOI,	  would	  be	  impossible	  owing	  to	  the	  dominance	  of	  global	  value	  chains	  in	  
global	   trade	   and	   production.	   By	   doing	   this,	   they	   explicitly	   reformulate	   the	   process	   and	  
trajectory	   of	   industrial	   development	   in	   terms	   of	   degrees	   of	   vertical	   specialisation	   and	  
upgrading	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   income21.	   For	  Milberg	   et.	   al.	   different	   stages	   of	   vertically	  
specialised	   industrial	   development	   necessitate	   different	   types	   of	   industrial	   policy	   to	  meet	  
different	  types	  of	  challenges.	  At	  early	  stages	  of	  industrial	  development	  industrial	  policy	  can	  
promote	   entry	   into	   value	   chains	   and	   export	   market	   access,	   for	   example	   by	   establishing	  
export	  processing	  zones.	  In	  order	  to	  promote	  successful	  upgrading,	  policy	  support	  needs	  to	  
address	  challenges	  posed	  by	  the	  ability	  for	  MNC	  lead	  firms	  to	  engender	  competition	  across	  
developing	  country	  suppliers,	  or	  intra-­‐chain	  competition	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  rents	  since	  
upgrading	  implies	  the	  capture	  of	  rents	  from	  someone	  else.	  	  
	  
GVC	   analysis,	   its	   application	   to	   industrial	   development	   and	   the	   explicit	   broadening	   of	   its	  
scope	  to	  contemporary	  industrialisation	  processes	  and	  industrial	  policy	  in	  VSI	  has	  resulted	  in	  
the	  reformulation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  industrialisation	  in	  economic	  growth	  and	  development	  and	  
associated	  industrial	  policy	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  
	  
First,	   the	  causal	  significance	  of	   industry	  as	  the	  engine	  of	  growth	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  
imperative	   to	   increase	   competitiveness	   at	   the	   level	   of	   firms	   and	   industries	   as	   the	   guiding	  
principle	  for,	  and	  goal	  of,	  industrial	  policy.	  This	  together	  with	  the	  almost	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  
the	   vertical	   nature	   of	   the	   chain	   in	   GVC	   and	   VSI	   has	   resulted	   in	   the	   framing	   of	  
industrialisation	   processes	   and	   policies	   entirely	   around	   the	   nature	   of	   intra-­‐chain	  
competition	   over	   rents	   and	   its	   implications	   for	   upgrading,	   and	   competition	   amongst	  
suppliers	   at	   different	   nodes	   on	   the	   chain.	   	   This	   reflects	   a	   broader	   shift	   from	   a	   macro	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Developmental	  state	  theory	  recognises	  the	  specific	  challenges	  for	  late-­‐industrialisation	  in	  a	  stratified	  global	  economy.	  (See	  for	  example	  
Chang	  2002,	  Fine	  2011).	  For	  catching	  up,	  see	  various	  works	  by	  Amsden	  (1997,	  2001),	  	  
21	  Milberg	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  posit	  that	  a	  U-­‐shaped	  relation	  exists	  between	  vertical	  specialisation	  and	  value	  added	  per	  worker.	  They	  argue	  that	  
vertical	  specialisation	  tends	  to	  be	  high	  in	  early	  phases	  of	  industrialisation	  as	  countries	  enter	  global	  value	  chains	  as	  suppliers	  in	  low-­‐value	  
added	  nodes	  of	  the	  chain.	  As	  firms	  begin	  to	  upgrade,	  vertical	  specialisation	  will	  fall	  with	  increasing	  value	  added.	  Once	  high	  value	  added	  
production	  is	  reached,	  vertical	  specialisation	  will	  increase	  again	  as	  firms	  focus	  on	  core	  competencies	  and	  outsource	  lower	  value	  added	  
components	  of	  production	  to	  reduce	  costs	  in	  response	  to	  shareholder	  pressure	  on	  profits.	  
conceptualisation	   of	   industrialisation	   within	   capitalist	   accumulation	   to	   its	   redefinition	   in	  
terms	  of	  microeconomic	  concepts	  such	  as	  competitiveness	  and	  transaction	  costs.	  
	  
Second,	  proponents	  of	  VSI	  advocate	  the	  disintegration	  of	  industry	  as	  policy	  objective.	  “With	  
GVCs,	   competitive	   improvements	   come	   not	  with	   the	   development	   of	   the	   fully	   integrated	  
scope	  of	  activities	  in	  an	  industry,	  but	  by	  moving	  into	  higher	  valued	  tasks	  associated	  with	  the	  
industry.”	  (Milberg	  et.	  al.	  28)	  	  Apart	  from	  issues	  around	  the	  adequacy	  of	  domestic	  demand	  
and	  a	  view	  that	  states	  are	  powerless	  in	  the	  face	  of	  multinationals,	  there	  are	  no	  compelling	  
reasons	  as	  to	  why	  competitive	  improvements	  might	  not	  be	  achieved	  within	  a	  diversified	  and	  
integrated	  industrial	  structure22.	  
	  
Third,	   by	   focussing	   only	   on	   the	   vertical	   nature	   of	   the	   chain	   and	   intra-­‐chain	   relations	   as	  
determining	  upgrading	  outcomes,	  GVC	  analysis	  emphasise	  the	  power	  of	   lead	  firms	  (MNCs)	  
in	  shaping	  chain	  relations	  and	  outcomes	  and	  as	  consequence,	  the	  futility	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
state	   and	   national	   industrial	   policy.	   The	   policy	   conclusions	   of	   GVC	   and	   VSI	   relegate	   state	  
intervention	  to	  supporting	  the	  private	  sector	  as	  opposed	  to	  directing	  it,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  for	  
the	  Developmental	  State	  Paradigm.	  	  
	  
Fourth,	   focus	  on	  vertical	  dimensions	  of	   the	  chain	  and	  vertical	   specialisation	   relies	  entirely	  
upon	  external	  demand	  with	   limited	  domestic	  growth	  pull	  effects,	  except	   in	  terms	  of	   intra-­‐
chain	  diversification	  such	  as	  the	  case	  of	  developing	  upstream	  production	  of	   inputs.	  Rather	  
than	  promote	  the	  type	  of	  interconnected,	  interdependent,	  complex	  industrial	  structure	  that	  
Kaldor	  saw	  as	  key	  to	  generating	  reinforcing	  and	  exponential	  growth	  dynamics,	  promotion	  of	  
intra-­‐chain	  connectedness	  and	  vertical	  specialisation	  limits	  the	  scope	  for	  complexity.	  
	  
Fifth,	  GVC	  and	  VSI,	  are	  concerned	  with	  how	  different	  industries	  will	  tend	  to	  different	  forms	  
of	  chain	  organisation	  and	  governance	  structures	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  opens	  up,	  or	  
pose	  challenges	  for,	  the	  possibility	  for	  different	  types	  upgrading.	  In	  consequence,	  industrial	  
policy	   is	  formulated	  with	   industry	  and	  activity	  specificity	   in	  mind	  but	  otherwise	  universally	  
applicable.	   This	   is	   a	   direct	   consequence	   of	   the	  way	   in	   which	   “theory	   of	   GVC	   governance	  
explicitly	  brackets	  the	  salience	  of	  institutional	  context	  and	  path-­‐dependent	  dynamics”	  (Bair	  
2008,	  p.357).	  	  	  
	  
Sixth,	   while	   stages	   posited	   by	   Milberg	   et.	   al.	   (2013)	   echo	   the	   stages	   of	   industrial	  
development	  put	  forward	  by	  Kaldor,	  the	  stages	  in	  VSI	  present	  themselves	  as	  necessary	  and	  
sequential	  goal	  posts	  of	  greater	  value	  addition	  via	  value	  chain	  upgrading	  and	  discarding	  of	  
lower	  value	  activities	   in	  a	   linear	  process	  of	  development.	  The	  VSI	  notion	  of	   stages	  has	  no	  
causal	   content.	   Milberg	   et.	   al.	   (2013)	   emphasise	   the	   mounting	   challenges	   developing	  
country	   firms	   face	   in	   upgrading;	   one	   thing	   does	   not	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   another23.	   By	  
contrast,	   as	   discussed	   in	   section	   2,	   the	   idealised	   stages	   put	   forward	   by	   Kaldor	   are	   based	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  China	  is	  presented	  by	  Milberg	  et.	  al.	  (2013)	  as	  the	  prime	  example	  of	  successful	  VSI	  
although	  the	  evidence	  that	  they	  present	  stands	  in	  contradiction	  to	  their	  vision	  of	  VSI.	  First,	  
the	  authors	  explicitly	  state	  that	  the	  policies	  of	  China	  are	  closer	  to	  those	  of	  other	  East	  Asian	  
developmental	  states	  and	  stress	  the	  role	  of	  domestic	  demand	  in	  bringing	  about	  successful	  
industrialisation.	  
23	  In	  reference	  to	  the	  book	  by	  Morris	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  
upon	   shifts	   in	   industrial	   structure	   and	   sources	   of	   demand	   that	   are	   conditioned	   by	   and	  
develop	   out	   of	   the	   previous	   stage.	   While	   VSI	   placed	   focus	   on	   vertically	   linked	   industrial	  
activities,	  emphasis	  is	  on	  external	  markets	  from	  the	  outset.	  In	  this	  way,	  VSI	  is	  devoid	  of	  the	  
growth	  pull	   effects	   that	   come	  with	   the	  development	  of	   a	   diversified,	   interdependent	   and	  
integrated	  industrial	  structure.	  
	  
Moreover,	  the	  model	  of	  VSI	  is	  not	  substantiated	  by	  historical	  industrialisation	  processes	  or	  
policies.	   Successful	   industrialisation	   has	   always	   in	   taken	   place	   with	   substantial	   state	  
intervention	   in	   the	   development	   of	   a	   diversified	   and	   integrated	   industrial	   base.	   Whilst	  
presented	  as	  novel,	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  integration	  and	  disintegration	  of	  production	  have	  
been	  part	  of	  industrialisation	  processes	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  Whilst	  there	  is	  an	  apparent	  upward	  
trend	  in	  global	  value	  chains	  that	  results	  in	  part	  from	  the	  acceleration	  of	  outsourcing	  by	  U.S.	  
and	   some	   European	  manufacturers	   as	   the	   outcome	  of	   the	   financialisation	   and	   associated	  
changes	   in	   financial	   imperatives	   faced	   by	   corporates	   in	   the	   U.S	   and	   Europe,	   there	   is	   no	  
reason	  given	  for	  why	  such	  a	  trend	  would	  continue.	  	  
	  
	  
…and	  Resource	  Based	  Industrialisation	  
	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  African	  continent,	  recent	  debate	  has	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  ‘resource-­‐based	  
industrialisation’	   (RBI)	   as	   the	   promotion	   of	   higher	   value-­‐added	   activities	   linked	   to	   natural	  
resources	  (both	  of	  and	  in	  the	  earth),	  heavily	  influence	  by	  Global	  Value	  Chain	  research24.	  
Growing	   world	   demand	   for	   commodities,	   the	   commodity	   price	   boom,	   and	   recent	  
discoveries	   of	   new	   natural	   resource	   reserves	   on	   the	   continent	   (e.g.	   off-­‐shore	   gas	   in	  
Mozambique	  and	  Tanzania	  and	  oil	  in	  Ghana),	  have	  resulted	  in	  the	  revisiting	  of	  old	  debates	  
around	  commodity	  dependency	  and	  development	  with	  the	  apparent	  setting	  free	  of	  African	  
countries	  from	  the	  shackles	  of	  the	  ‘resource	  curse’25	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  RBI	  in	  its	  place,	  i.e.	  
the	   promotion	   of	   vertical	   upgrading	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   natural	   endowments	   .	   The	   expected	  
persistence	  of	  strong	  demand	  for	  African	  commodities	  from	  China,	  and	  other	  fast	  growing	  
economies	  outside	  of	  the	  global	  north,	  are	  seen	  to	  provide	  the	  opportunities	   for	  resource	  
exporting	  countries	  to	  upgrade	  and	  diversify	  vertically	  along	  natural	  resource	  chains	  that	  are	  
relatively	   underexploited	   on	   the	   continent	   in	   comparison	   with	   Asian	   or	   Latin	   American	  
countries	  where	  concentration	  indices	  are	  0.12	  and	  0.13	  respectively	  (see	  figure	  1).	  (UNECA	  
2013)	   Resource-­‐based	   industrialisation	   thus	   reflects	   a	   convergence	   between	   GVCD	   and	  
vertical	   specialisation	   industrialisation	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  New	  Structural	   Economics	  on	  
the	  other	  where	  notions	  of	  value	  chain	  upgrading	  are	  coherent	  with	  the	  law	  of	  comparative	  
advantage	  and	  policy	  implications	  almost	  entirely	  overlap.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  The	  intellectual	  justification	  being	  provided	  by	  prominent	  GVC	  scholars	  including	  Kaplinsky	  (2000),	  Morris	  and	  Barnes	  (2008)	  on	  textiles	  
and	  clothing	  and	  Morris,	  Kaplinsky	  and	  Kaplan	  (2012)	  
25	  Resource	  curse	  here	  refers	  collectively	  to	  the	  Prebisch-­‐Singer	  hypothesis,	  Dutch-­‐Disease	  and	  the	  narrower	  resource	  curse	  literature	  
based	  upon	  arguments	  of	  the	  New	  Institutional	  Economics.	  
Figure	  1	  Export	  Dependence	  and	  diversification	  
Country	   Export	   product	  
concentration	  index	  (a	  
higher	   value	  
represents	   higher	  
dependence	   on	   one	  
product)	  
Export	   product	  
diversification	  index	  (a	  
higher	   value	  
represents	   less	  
diversification	   of	  
exports)	  
Top	   three	   exports	   (%	   of	   total	  
merchandise	  exports)	  
Primary	   commodities	   %	  
merchandise	   exports	  
(including	   food	  
commodities,	   precious	  
stones	   and	   gold).	   Data	  
source	   varies	   from	   2007-­‐
2011	   with	   exception	   of	  
Eritrea	  (2003).	  
Southern	  Africa	  
Angola	   0.97	   0.8	   	   	  
Botswana	   0.79	   0.89	   83%	   Diamonds	   excl.	   ind’l,	   Nickel	  
mattes,	  Gold	  non-­‐monetary	  excl	  ores.	  
88	  
Lesotho	   0.33	   0.83	   10%	   non-­‐alcoh.	   Beverage,	   wool,	  
diamonds	  excl.	  ind’l	  
15	  
Malawi	   0.53	   0.84	   53%	   tobacco,	   sugars	   raw	   (beet	   or	  
cane)	  
90	  
Mauritius	   0.25	   0.71	   26%	  fish,	  raw	  and	  other	  sugars	   39	  
Mozambique	   0.51	   0.81	   70%	   Aluminium	   and	   alloys,	   electric	  
current,	  natural	  gas	  
91	  
Namibia	   0.22	   0.77	   39%	   Diamonds	   excl	   ind’l,	   uranium,	  
fish	  
71	  
South	  Africa	   0.16	   0.6	   27%	   platinum,	   other	   coal,	   gold	   non-­‐
monetary	  
61	  
Swaziland	   0.28	   0.78	   18%	   Sugars,	   chem.	   woodpulp,	   soda,	  
wood	  
30	  
Zambia	   0.63	   0.85	   76%	   copper	   (anodes,	   alloys,	   plate,	  
ores	  and	  concentrates)	  
91	  
Zimbabwe	   0.2	   0.73	   36%	   nickel	   mattes,	   sintrs,	   tobacco,	  




Burundi	   0.54	   0.75	   79%	  coffee,	  gold,	  tea	   92	  
Comoros	   0.51	   0.75	   14%	  Spices	   14	  
Democratic	   Republic	  
of	  Congo	  
0.43	   0.78	   	   	  
Djibouti	   0.35	   0.61	   18%	  Milk,	  food	  preparations,	  palm	  oil	   24	  
Eritrea	   0.65	   0.83	   27%Fish,	  bone,	  horn,	  ivory	  coral	   68	  
Ethiopia	   0.36	   0.79	   55%	  coffee,	  sesame,	  other	  vegetables	   90	  
Kenya	   0.18	   0.65	   35%	   tea,	   cut	   flowers,	   other	  
vegetables	  
62	  
Madagascar	   0.21	   0.77	   15%	   crustaceans,	   spices,	   ore	   etc.	  
(molybdenum)	  
35	  
Rwanda	   0.4	   0.84	   55%	  tin	  ores,	  coffee,	  teac	   81	  
Tanzania	   0.19	   0.77	   58%	   gold,	   prec	   metals,	   manganese	  
ores	  and	  concentrates	  
84	  
Uganda	   0.21	   0.73	   27%	  coffee,	  fish,	  tea	   64	  
Seychelles	   0.51	   0.83	   41%	  fish,	  fat,	  oils.	   42	  
Somalia	   0.33	   0.7	   	   	  
	  
Source:	  UNECA	  /	  AU	  (2013)	  “Making	  the	  Most	  of	  Africa’s	  Commodities:	  Industrializing	  for	  Growth,	  Jobs	  and	  Economic	  Transformation:	  Economic	  
Report	  on	  Africa”,	  UNECA	  Addis	  Ababa,	  p.77,p.	  120-­‐124	  	  
	  
	  
Proponents	   of	   RBI,	   most	   notable	   in	   the	   recent	   work	   of	   Morris	   et	   al.	   (2012),	   the	   UNECA	  
(2013)	  report	  and	  Jourdan	  (2001?no	  date),	  recognise	  the	  imperative	  for	  African	  countries	  to	  
industrialise	   as	   resulting	   from	   the	   global	   context	   of	   heightened	   competition	   (via	   value	  
chains)	   and	   the	   corroboration	   of	   the	   inverted	   U	   relation	   between	   manufacturing	   value	  
added	  (MVA)	  and	  per	  capita	  income,	  echoing	  Kuznets	  and	  others	  discussed	  above	  (Morris	  et	  
al.	  2012).	  However,	   in	  contrast	   to	  scholars	  of	   the	  classical	  political	  economy	  tradition,	   the	  
inverted	   U	   relation	   is	   taken	   as	   empirical	   fact	   rather	   than	   theorised;	   no	   causal	   relation	   is	  
attributed	  to	  industrialisation	  in	  relation	  to	  economic	  growth.26	  	  
	  
The	  tendency	  for	  Morris	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  to	  revisit	  ‘old’	  ideas	  and	  apply	  them	  in	  new	  ways,	  torn	  
from	  a	  macro	   theory	  of	  capital	  accumulation,	   is	  also	  evident	   in	   their	  appeal	   to	  Hirschman	  
and	   the	   role	   of	   input-­‐output	   linkages	   in	   industrial	   processes.	  While	   noting	   the	   variety	   of	  
linkages	   identified	  by	  Hirschman	  as	  significant	   in	  the	  process	  of	   industrialisation,	  Morris	  et	  
al.	   (2012)	  focus	  only	  on	  vertical	  production	   linkages.	  Moreover,	  rather	  than	   linkages	  being	  
understood	   as	   one	   dimension	   of	   interdependencies	   within	   a	   demand-­‐centred	   cumulative	  
causal	   process,	   they	   are	   viewed	   in	   limited	   scope	   as	   a	   source	   of	   scale	   economies.	   	   The	  
emphasis	  of	  Morris	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  on	  the	  development	  of	   linked	  industries	  is	  thus	  limited	  to	  
the	  vertical	  chain	  and	  the	  opportunities	   that	   that	  arise	  within	   it	   rather	  than	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  
broader	  strategy	  of	  industrial	  development	  based	  on	  cumulative	  causal	  processes.	  
	  
The	  position	  of	  Morris	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   in	   relation	   to	   commodity	   dependence/resource	   curse	  
debates	   is	   one	   of	   optimism	   justified	   by	   favourable	   price	   conditions	   on	   world	   markets27.	  
While	  it	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  discuss	  recent	  and	  historical	  debates,	  it	  should	  
be	   noted	   that	   it	   refers	   to	   numerous	   and	   distinct	   processes,	   the	   existence	   and	   nature	   of	  
which	  are	  heavily	  contested,	  historically	  and	  institutionally	  contingent	  as	  well	  as	  conditioned	  
on,	  as	  well	  as	  shaping,	  the	  productive	  structure	  of	  an	  economy.	  (Di	  John	  2011;	  Yeats	  1991)	  
For	  Morris	   et	   al.	   (2012),	   potential	   challenges	   for	   industrialisation	   identified	   in	   the	   various	  
resource	  curse	  literatures	  are	  simply	  swept	  aside	  rather	  than	  assessed	  in	  relation	  to	  specific	  
sectors,	   industries,	   historical	   and	   institutional	   contexts.	   One	   such	   example	   is	   the	   way	   in	  
which	  Morris	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  deal	  with	  traditional	  arguments	  that	  resource-­‐based	  development	  
result	  in	  enclaves	  with	  limited	  positive	  spill-­‐overs	  into	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  economy.	  Here,	  Morris	  
et	   al.	   (2012)	   argue	   that	   the	   tendency	   towards	   enclaves	   is	   both	   overstated	   and	   outdated.	  
Moreover,	  such	  problems	  can	  be	  solved	  through	  the	  development	  of	  shared	  infrastructure	  
and	  technological	  capabilities	  that	  can	  support	  both	  upstream	  (capital	  equipment	  and	  other	  
inputs)	   and	   downstream	   (beneficiation)	   linkage	   development.	   In	   fact,	   the	   key	   policy	  
conclusions	  drawn	  from	  RBI	  are	  the	  development	  of	  shared	  infrastructure	  and	  technological	  
capabilities,	   echoing	   the	   policy	   recommendations	   coming	   from	   industrial	   cluster	   research	  
and	  GVCD.	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   role,	   process	   and	   dynamics	   of	   industrialisation,	   RBI	  
carries	   forward	   the	   implications	   discussed	   above	   in	   relation	   to	   GVCD	   and	   VSI.	   While	  
proponents	  of	  RBI	  base	  their	  arguments	  upon	  a	  number	  of	  concepts	  coming	  from	  classical	  
political	  economy,	  most	  notably	  the	  role	  of	  input-­‐output	  linkages	  as	  building	  upon	  existing	  
potential	   investment	   demand,	   their	   deployment	   within	   RBI	   is	   relegated	   to	   micro	  
conceptions	   of	   industrial	   organisation	   and	   comparative	   static	   analysis	   divorced	   from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Moreover,	  the	  appeal	  to	  the	  apparent	  empirical	  correlation	  between	  manufacturing	  and	  economic	  development	  might	  be	  questioned	  in	  
relation	  to	  differences	  in	  industrialisation	  processes	  across	  countries	  and	  overtime.	  Szirmai	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  ambiguities	  arise	  from:	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  manufacturing	  contributions	  are	  measured	  (e.g.	  growth	  accounting,	  econometric	  techniques),	  in	  particular	  the	  difficulties	  in	  
capturing	   external	   and	   spillover	   effects	   and	   of	   dynamic	   sectors;	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   sequence	   of	   structural	   change	   is	   different	   for	  
latecomer	  developing	  countries	  than	  it	  was	  for	  the	  early	  industrialisers;	  the	  period	  in	  time	  during	  which	  technological	  and	  income	  catch-­‐up	  
occurred	   (with	   the	   period	   between	   1950-­‐1973	   cited	   as	   offering	   special	   opportunities	   through	   absorption	   of	   US-­‐style	  mass	   production	  
manufacturing);	   the	  rise	  of	   technologies	  such	  as	   ICT	  not	  specific	   to	  manufacturing,	  but	  also	  relevant	   to	  services;	  whether	   the	  growth	   is	  
categorised	  as	  normal,	  accelerating	  or	  decelerating.	  
27	  The	  authors	  refer	  not	  only	  to	  the	  price	  of	  natural	  resource	  based	  output	  but	  also	  an	  apparent	  downward	  trend	  in	  manufactured	  
products	  from	  developing	  countries.	  (Morris	  et.	  al.	  2012)	  
dynamic	  macro	  processes	  of	   capital	  accumulation.	  Rather	   than	  contributing	   to	  cumulative	  
causal	   processes,	   input-­‐output	   linkages	   serve	   as	   stepping	   stones	   towards	   higher-­‐value	  
added	  activities.	  
	  
It	   is	   not	   the	   intention	  of	   this	   paper	   to	  discredit	   or	   argue	  against	   state	   intervention	   in	   the	  
development	  of	  resource	  linked	  economic	  activities.	  Both	  the	  development	  of	  downstream	  
value	   addition	   in	   the	   form	   of	   beneficiation	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   processing,	   and	   upstream	  
linked	   industries,	   provide	   great	   potential	   for	   value	   addition	   and	   greater	   contributions	   to	  
GDP.	  	  The	  development	  of	  resource	  linked	  industries	  means	  that	  economies	  can	  “make	  the	  
most”	  of	  a	  countries	   static	  endowments,	  allowing	  economies	   to	  gain	   from	  the	  production	  
and	   sale	   of	   “low-­‐hanging	   fruit”	   (Morris	   et	   al.	   2012	   p.208)	   as	  well	   as	   the	   development	   of	  
upstream	  and	  downstream	  linkages	  and	  diversify28.	  Rather,	  our	  main	  contention	  is	  that	  RBI,	  
in	   and	   of	   itself,	   does	   not	   amount	   to	   the	   type	   of	   industrialisation	   strategy	   that	   can	   bring	  
about	   the	   type	   of	   broad	   based,	   self-­‐sustaining,	   employment	   generating	   and	   equalising	  
economic	  growth	  envisaged	  by	  cumulative	  causation	   theorists.	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	   the	  
next	  section,	   industrial	  development	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  development	  of	   linked	   industries	  
within	  resource	  sectors	  without	  integrating	  these	  sectors	  into	  a	  broader	  industrial	  structure	  
is	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  skewed	  industrial	  development	  that	  fails	  to	  absorb	  labour	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  wages	  rise	  sufficiently	  to	  support	  domestic	  demand	  and	  improve	  equality.	  	  The	  extent	  
to	  which	  industrial	  policy	  can	  translate	  to	  broader	  based	  development	  will	  depend	  upon	  the	  
fiscal	   capacity	   of	   the	   state	   to	   appropriate	   mineral	   rents,	   the	   ownership	   structure	   of	   the	  
mineral	  sector	  and	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  develop	  dual-­‐track	  growth	  strategies	  (Di	  John	  
2012,	  p.176).	  
	  
Moreover,	   as	   will	   be	   suggested	   the	   next	   section,	   the	   historical	   and	   political	   context,	   the	  
nature	  of	   the	   resource	  both	  within	   the	  domestic	  economy	  and	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  global	  
economy	   as	   well	   as	   resource	   specificities	   and	   the	   specific	   institutional	   and	   industrial	  
structure	   of	   economies	   in	   question	   are	   all	   critical	   in	   relation	   both	   to	   the	   nature	   of	   policy	  
formulation	   and	   implementation	   and	   their	   outcome.	   These	   critical	   issues	   are	   largely	   left	  
aside	  in	  the	  current	  approaches	  to	  resource-­‐led	  industrialisation	  that	  remain	  firmly	  focused	  
entry	  and	  value	  capture	  within	  global	  value	  chains,	  and	  selective	  about	  their	  understanding	  
of	  the	  nature	  and	  drivers	  of	  linkages.	  	  
	  
	  
5. The	  political	  economy	  of	  resource	  based	  development	  in	  South	  Africa	  
	  
5.1 The	  MEC	  and	  South	  Africa’s	  industrial	  structure	  
By	  taking	  the	  case	  of	  historical	  industrial	  development	  in	  South	  Africa,	  this	  section	  illustrates	  
how	   the	   nature	   and	   extent	   of	   (input-­‐output)	   linkages,	   fostered	   through	   industrial	   policy,	  
have	  shaped	   industrial	   structure	  and	   its	  hysteretic	  path	  and	   in	  consequence	  the	  nature	  of	  
persistent	   structural	   unemployment	   (marked	   by	   the	   inability	   for	   the	   economy	   to	   absorb	  
labour)	  and	  inequality.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Here	  the	  portfolio	  concept	  of	  risk	  informs	  the	  need	  for	  a	  country	  to	  diversify	  exports	  rather	  than	  being	  dependent	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
exports	  for	  foreign	  exchange	  earnings.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  creating	  a	  broad	  based,	  diversified,	  yet	  integrated	  industrial	  
structure.	  
The	  case	  of	  historical	   industrialisation	   in	  South	  Africa	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  closely	   following	   the	  
strategy	   promoted	   by	   Morris	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   and	   UNECA	   (2013)	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	  
section.	   It	   is	  beyond	   the	  scope	  of	   this	  paper	   to	  discuss	   the	  political	  economy	  of	   industrial	  
policy	  and	  development	  in	  South	  Africa	  that	  informed	  the	  motivation	  and	  form	  of	  industrial	  
policy	   during	   the	   apartheid	   period29.	   For	   the	   purpose	   of	   debate	   with	   the	   promotion	   of	  
resource	  based	   industrialisation	   in	   the	  context	  of	  African	   industrialisation	   today,	  we	   focus	  
on	  the	  form	  of	   industrial	  policy	  and	  development	   itself,	  namely,	  the	  systematic	  promotion	  
of	   industries	   linked	   to	  mining	   and	   ad	   hoc	   intervention	   in	   sectors	   outside	   of	   the	   so	   called	  
“minerals	  energy	  complex”	  (MEC)	  (Fine	  and	  Rustomjee	  1996).	  	  
	  
Industrial	  development	  has	  been	  closely	  tied	  to	  mining	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  capitalist	  
development	   in	   South	   Africa.	   The	   centrality	   of	   mining	   activities	   in	   the	   South	   African	  
Economy	   in	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   20th	   Century	   shaped	   the	   development	   of	   the	  manufacturing	  
sector	  through	  diversification	  and	  extension	  of	  activities	  by	  the	  mining	  conglomerates	  and	  
state	   owned	   enterprises.	   These	   activities	   included	   downstream	   mineral	   processing,	  
engineering,	   the	   steel	   and	   chemicals	   sector,	   other	   manufacturing	   sectors,	   and	   banking.	  	  
Heavy	   state	   intervention	   in	   industry	   between	   the	   1950s	   and	   1980	   was	   focussed	   on	   the	  
promotion	   and	   development	   of	   large	   scale,	   capital	   intensive,	   sectors	   linked	   to	   extractive	  
industries.	   From	   this	   emerged,	   what	   Fine	   and	   Rustomjee	   (1996)	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   ‘MEC	  
core’,	  a	  set	  of	  industries	  identified	  by	  very	  strong	  input-­‐output	  linkages	  with	  each	  other	  and	  
weak	  linkages	  that	  serve	  as	  the	  core	  site	  of	  capital	  accumulation30.	  These	  are:	  
	  
Coal	  mining	  
Gold	  and	  Uranium	  mining	  
Other	  mining	  
Petroleum,	  chemicals,	  rubber	  and	  plastic	  
Non-­‐metallic	  minerals	  
Basic	  iron	  and	  steel	  
Basic	  non-­‐ferrous	  metals	  
Metal	  products	  excluding	  machinery	  
Machinery	  and	  equipment	  
Electricity,	  gas	  and	  steam	  
Transport	  and	  storage	  
	  
The	  cohesion	  of	  the	  MEC	  is	  illustrated	  by	  figure	  2	  which	  shows	  that	  70%	  of	  productive	  inputs	  
into	  the	  MEC	  sectors	  come	  from	  the	  MEC	  core	  itself	  and	  56%	  of	  intermediate	  output	  from	  
MEC	  sectors	  goes	  back	  into	  the	  MEC	  core	  as	  inputs.	  By	  contrast,	  only	  25%	  of	  intermediate	  
inputs	   into	   non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	   sectors	   are	   sourced	   from	   the	  MEC	   and	   only	   10%	   of	  
intermediate	  output	  from	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors	  is	  fed	  into	  MEC	  sectors	  as	  inputs.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  	  See	  Fine	  and	  Rustomjee	  (1996),	  Ashman,	  Fine	  and	  Newman	  (2013),	  and	  Clarke	  (1994)	  for	  political	  economy	  analyses	  of	  industrial	  policy	  
and	  industrial	  development	  in	  South	  Africa.	  
30	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  strong	  material	   interdependencies	  of	  the	  MEC	  core	  sectors,	  these	  sectors	  exhibited	  highly	  concentrated	  ownership.	  
While	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  on	  the	  input-­‐output	  dimension	  of	  the	  MEC	  defined	  as	  a	  core	  set	  of	  industries,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  
MEC	  is	  an	  analytical	  concept	  that	  developed	  out	  of,	  and	  deployed	  within,	  an	  analysis	  of	  industrial	  development	  of	  South	  Africa	  historically	  
that	  simultaneously	  focusses	  on	  different	  dimensions	  of	  interdependencies	  between	  fractions	  of	  capital,	  industrial	  development	  and	  the	  
state.	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  coherence	  and	  cohesion	  of	  the	  MEC	  has	  persisted	  throughout	  the	  
four	   decades	   since	   1970.	   The	   strength	   of	   direct	   forward	   and	   backward	   linkages	   between	  
MEC-­‐subsectors	  has	   remained	  remarkably	  stable	  since	  1970.	  This	  cohesion	  and	  coherence	  
has	  resulted,	  not	  only	  in	  determining	  the	  dynamics	  of	  its	  own	  expansion	  and	  development	  
via	   some	  of	   the	   growth/demand	  pull	  mechanisms	   that	   underlie	   cumulative	   causation	   but	  
also	  in	  conditioning	  the	  nature	  of	  industrial	  development	  outside	  of	  the	  MEC-­‐core.	  Because	  
of	  its	  lack	  of	  integration	  with	  economic	  activities	  more	  broadly31,	  expansion	  of	  the	  MEC-­‐core	  
has	  occurred	  in	  relative	  isolation	  from,	  and	  at	  the	  expense	  of,	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors,	  in	  particular	  
labour	   intensive	  manufacturing	  of	  consumer	  goods	  -­‐	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  which	  typified	  
the	  early	  stages	  of	  industrial	  development	  historically	  as	  discussed	  above.	  A	  major	  corollary	  
of	   this	   has	   been	   an	   industrial	   structure	   skewed	   in	   favour	   of	   capital	   intensive,	   heavy,	  
industries	   that	  have	  made	  up	  between	  50	  and	  62	  per	   cent	  of	   total	  manufacturing	  output	  
since	   the	  1970s	   (see	   figure	  3)32,	  and	  as	  consequence,	  persistent	   structural	  unemployment	  
and	  worsening	  inequality	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  structural	  transformation	  of	  the	  economy.	  
	  
Figure	  2	  Material	  interdependencies	  within	  (and	  without)	  the	  MEC	  core	  in	  2010	  
Share	  of	  intermediate	  inputs	  from/output	  to	  MEC	  	  







outputs	  to	  MEC	  
%	  intermediate	  
output	  
Agriculture,	  forestry	  and	  fishing	   33448	   55%	   1600	   2%	  
Coal	  mining	   6559	   74%	   12177	   93%	  
Gold	  and	  uranium	  ore	  mining	   2141	   58%	   46	   5%	  
Other	  mining	   41873	   79%	   76920	   84%	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Manufacturing	  	   441579	   50%	   287648	   34%	  
Food,	  beverages	  and	  tobacco	  	   19045	   13%	   1270	   3%	  
Textiles,	  clothing	  and	  leather	   6917	   23%	   1925	   9%	  
Wood	  and	  paper;	  publishing	  and	  printing	   18207	   24%	   5716	   6%	  
Coke	  and	  refined	  petroleum	  products	  	   66654	   88%	   49417	   54%	  
Basic	  chemicals	   47612	   81%	   50432	   67%	  
Other	  chemicals	  and	  man-­‐made	  fibres	   41494	   71%	   28564	   41%	  
Rubber	  products	   5473	   63%	   5460	   56%	  
Plastic	  products	   11139	   71%	   9342	   32%	  
Non-­‐metallic	  minerals	   12936	   71%	   2971	   11%	  
Basic	  iron	  and	  steel	   72208	   82%	   44728	   62%	  
Basic	  non-­‐ferrous	  metals	   18437	   88%	   17117	   63%	  
Metal	  products	  excluding	  machinery	   28279	   75%	   16764	   46%	  
Machinery	  and	  equipment	   24281	   70%	   26332	   55%	  
Electrical	  machinery	  and	  apparatus	   15240	   57%	   6252	   20%	  
Radio,	  TV,	  instruments,	  watches	  and	  clocks	   1424	   16%	   375	   2%	  
Transport	  equipment	   30020	   22%	   17539	   15%	  
Furniture	  and	  other	  manufacturing	   20543	   57%	   2331	   13%	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Electricity,	  gas	  and	  steam	   10839	   43%	   18988	   55%	  
Construction	  (contractors)	  	   56786	   36%	   6160	   8%	  
	   	   	   	   	  
Trade,	  catering	  and	  accommodation	  services	   36452	   18%	   48040	   24%	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Except	  through	  common	  ownership	  within	  the	  conglomerate	  structure	  that	  prevailed	  over	  the	  economy	  until	  the	  transition	  from	  
apartheid.	  
32	  At	  the	  sectoral	  level,	  the	  MEC	  thus	  provides	  an	  analytical	  description	  of	  historical	  industrial	  development	  in	  South	  Africa	  as	  skewed	  in	  
favour	  of	  mining	  and	  related	  industry	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  diversified	  industrial	  base.	  
Transport	  and	  storage	   39514	   36%	   70181	   51%	  
Communication	   13988	   20%	   7545	   8%	  
Financial	  intermediation,	  insurance,	  real	  estate	  and	  
business	  services	   32110	   10%	   70211	   15%	  
Community,	  social	  and	  personal	  services	   45194	   16%	   16316	   12%	  
	   	   	   	   	  
MEC	   429439	   70%	   429439	   56%	  
MEC	  manufacturing	   379086	   79%	   251127	   52%	  
non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	   113067	   25%	   36521	   10%	  
Services	  (excl.	  general	  government	  and	  transport	  and	  
storage)	   103053	   15%	   142015	   17%	  
Other	  sectors	   976675	   59%	   9786	   4%	  
Data	  Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3	  Share	  of	  sectoral	  net	  value	  of	  output	  in	  total	  manufacturing	  1924-­‐2010	  
	   1924/25*	   1948/49*	   1975/76*	   1975+	   1990+	   2000+	   2010+	  
Food,	  beverages	  and	  tobacco	   32.4	   19	   14.1	   19.8	   21.2	   16.7	   16.5	  
Textile,	  clothing,	  leather,	  footwear	   10	   15.2	   10.4	   6.2	   5.9	   4.8	   3.7	  
Wood	  and	  furniture	   6.9	   6.4	   3.2	   3.1	   3.1	   3.3	   3.3	  
Paper,	  printing	  and	  publishing	   11.2	   7.7	   7.7	   6.1	   7.3	   6.8	   6.4	  
Other	  manufacturing	   2.7	   3.4	   3.3	   3.1	   5.8	   4.5	   3.9	  
Total	  light	  industry	   63.2	   51.7	   38.7	   38.4	   43.3	   36.1	   33.8	  
Chemicals	  and	  chemical	  products	   12.1	   9.5	   11.4	   11.5	   16.8	   23.9	   23.9	  
Pottery,	  glass,	  other	  non-­‐metallic	  minerals	   7	   6	   5.3	   4.7	   4.0	   2.5	   2.7	  
Basic	  metals	  industries	   8.9	   17.6	   13	   8.5	   8.6	   9.8	   11.7	  
Metal	  products	  and	  machinery	   3.3	   5	   22.7	   18.1	   12.4	   9.4	   8.9	  
Transport	  equipment	   5.3	   7.8	   7.2	   13.0	   9.6	   12.9	   13.9	  
Rubber	  products	   0.2	   2.4	   1.7	   0.9	   1.2	   1.1	   0.9	  
Total	  heavy	  industry	   36.8	   48.4	   61.3	   56.8	   52.6	   59.7	   61.9	  
Electrical	  machinery	  &	  apparatus,	  radio,	  TV,	  
instruments	  and	  clocks	  
/-­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   4.8	   4.0	   4.2	   4.2	  
Total	  manufacturing	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	   100	  
*	  Figures	  taken	  from	  Feinstein	  (2005)	  
+	  Authors	  own	  calculations	  based	  upon	  SASSID	  data	  for	  total	  output	  (intermediate	  +	  final	  in	  current	  prices)	  figures	  for	  industrial	  subsectors	  
	  
Taken	   together,	   the	  MEC	  sectors	  continue	   to	  dominate	   industrial	  output	  and	  exports	   (see	  
figures	  2	  and	  3).	  Whilst	  modest	  growth	  in	  GDP	  has	  occurred	  since	  1994,	  this	  has	  occurred	  in	  
tandem	   with	   worsening	   unemployment.	   It	   is	   argued	   here	   that	   the	   persistently	   high	  
unemployment	   rate	   has	   its	   roots	   in	   industrial	   structure	   that	   developed	   out	   of	   industrial	  
policy	  and	  development	   in	  the	  apartheid	  period.	  The	  related	  rapid	  decline	  of	  a	  number	  of	  
labour	  intensive	  non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	  sectors	  since	  1994	  can	  in	  part	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  their	  weak	   integration	  with	  the	  broader	   industrial	  structure	  and	  lack	  of	   industrial	  policy	  
intervention	   to	   manage	   the	   winding	   down	   of	   sunset	   industries	   or	   retooling	   and	   capital	  
upgrading	  of	  others	  (as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  South	  Korea	  in	  relation	  to	  textiles	  and	  clothing	  
sectors	   for	   example).33	   Investment	   in	   MEC	   sectors	   has	   also	   been	   stagnant,	   with	   the	  
exception	  of	  platinum,	  with	  output	  earnings	  largely	  propped	  up	  by	  high	  commodity	  prices.	  
This	  does	  point	   to	   the	  view	   that	  South	  Africa	  has	  not	   ‘made	   the	  most	  of	   commodities’	  as	  
argued	  by	  Morris	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  There	  are	  clear	  gains	  to	  be	  made	  in	  terms	  of	  contribution	  to	  
GDP	   and	   employment	   generation	   from	   developing	   forward	   and	   backward	   linkages	   to	  
extractive	  industries,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  MEC	  core.	  The	  main	  concern	  
here	   is	   whether	   this	   could	   translate	   to	   structural	   transformation	   of	   the	   type	   that	   would	  
result	  in	  broader	  based	  industrialisation	  as	  the	  driver	  for	  inclusive	  growth.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4	  Contribution	  of	  MEC	  and	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors	  to	  gross	  domestic	  output	  
 
Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  There	  are	  several	  other	  causes	  of	  decline	  in	  labour-­‐intensive	  industries	  such	  as	  external	  competitive	  pressures,	  shifts	  in	  investment	  
patterns,	  and	  changes	  to	  employment	  structures.	  These	  are	  acknowledged	  but	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  An	  overview	  discussion	  of	  
wage-­‐reductions	  to	  improve	  productivity	  and	  competitiveness,	  in	  particular	  in	  response	  to	  capital	  account	  and	  trade	  liberalisation	  can	  be	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Figure	  5	  Contribution	  of	  MEC	  and	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors	  to	  exports	  
 
Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	  
	  
	  
The	  capital	  intensity	  of	  MEC-­‐subsectors	  means	  that	  they	  have	  little	  capacity	  to	  absorb	  
labour.	  Moreover,	  the	  relatively	  weak	  forward	  and	  backward	  linkages	  of	  MEC-­‐subsectors	  
with	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors	  have	  meant	  that	  expansion	  of	  the	  MEC	  has	  weak	  employment	  
multipliers,	  i.e.	  the	  potential	  to	  stimulate	  other	  employment	  generating	  activities.	  The	  
problem	  of	  unemployment	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  structural,	  with	  deep	  roots	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  industrial	  development	  in	  South	  Africa.	  
	  
Recent	  studies	  by	  Tregenna	  (2008)	  and	  CSID	  (2010)	  found	  that	  non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	  
sectors	  such	  as	  furniture,	  leather	  and	  leather	  products,	  food	  and	  beverages,	  textiles	  and	  
wearing	  apparel	  have	  the	  highest	  employment	  multipliers	  and	  backward	  linkages.	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  shows	  the	  sectoral	  shares	  of	  total	  employment.	  Employment	  within	  the	  MEC	  core	  
has	  declined	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  from	  1.4	  million	  in	  1980	  (1.9	  million	  if	  transport	  and	  
storage	  is	  included)	  to	  1.1	  million	  in	  2010	  (1.6	  million	  including	  transport	  and	  storage	  
sectors).	  	  Employment	  has	  fallen	  in	  absolute	  terms	  across	  non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	  as	  a	  
whole.	  The	  number	  of	  employees	  employed	  in	  each	  subsector	  was	  lower	  in	  2010	  compared	  
with	  1990	  in	  all	  except	  for	  other	  manufactures,	  printing,	  publishing	  and	  recorded	  media,	  
and	  wood	  and	  wood	  products	  and	  beverages.	  So	  whilst,	  developing	  domestic	  industries	  
linked	  to	  resources	  will	  certainly	  raise	  employment	  and	  output,	  such	  a	  strategy	  will	  be	  
limited	  in	  terms	  of	  solving	  South	  Africa’s	  problems	  of	  unemployment	  and	  inequality	  that	  
emerge	  out	  of	  its	  industrial	  structure,	  unless	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  industrial	  strategy	  that	  
recognises	  the	  need	  for	  a	  broad	  based,	  diversified	  and	  integrated	  industrial	  structure.	  The	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Figure	  6	  Contribution	  of	  MEC	  and	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors	  to	  employment	  
 
Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	  
 
	  
The	  only	  two	  non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	  sectors	  to	  have	  experienced	  significant	  growth	  in	  
output	  and	  investment	  in	  recent	  years	  have	  been	  food	  and	  motor	  vehicles	  and	  parts.	  For	  the	  
latter,	  this	  has	  been	  a	  direct	  outcome	  of	  the	  government’s	  Motor	  Industry	  Development	  
Program	  (MIDP)	  which	  has	  led	  to	  increased	  investment	  in	  the	  sector	  since	  1995	  (figure	  8).	  
The	  expansion	  of	  the	  leather	  industry	  is	  also	  connected	  to	  the	  growth	  in	  motor	  vehicles	  and	  
parts	  as	  the	  sector	  provided	  inputs	  into	  vehicle	  interiors.	  Food	  sector	  expansion	  relates	  to	  
the	  growing	  role	  of	  domestic	  consumption	  and	  the	  increasing	  concentration	  and	  expansion	  
of	  the	  four	  big	  retail	  chains:	  Pick	  and	  Pay,	  Shoprite,	  Massmart	  (recently	  taken	  over	  by	  
Walmart)	  and	  Spar	  and	  their	  significance	  in	  regional	  food	  supply	  chins.	  Growth	  in	  these	  
sectors	  has	  been	  the	  exception	  rather	  than	  the	  rule	  in	  an	  otherwise	  stagnant	  and	  failing	  
non-­‐Manufacturing	  sector.	  Figure	  9	  shows	  that	  fixed	  capital	  stock	  in	  a	  number	  of	  
manufacturing	  subsectors	  has	  been	  decreasing	  since	  1990.34	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  The	  case	  of	  textiles	  and	  clothing	  is	  an	  example	  of	  non-­‐MEC	  sector	  experiences	  during	  MEC-­‐led	  industrialisation,	  the	  weak	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Figure	  7	  Value	  added	  at	  factor	  costs	  from	  non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	  sectors	  1990,	  2000	  &	  2010	  
 
Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8	  Gross	  domestic	  fixed	  investment	  in	  non-­‐MEC	  manufacturing	  sectors	  1990,	  2000	  &	  2010	  
 
Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	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Figure	  9	  Change	  in	  fixed	  capital	  stock	  across	  non-­‐MEC	  sectors	  1990,	  2000	  &	  2010	  
 
Source:	  Quantec	  (RSA	  Standardised	  Industry)	  2011	  
  
	  
The	   focus	  of	   this	   section	   is	   on	   the	  nature	  of	   physical	   interdependencies,	   i.e.	   input-­‐output	  
relationship,	  between	  different	  productive	  subsectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  Focus	  on	  this	  vertical	  
dimension	  of	  industrial	  structure	  allows	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  of	  industrial	  development	  to	  
be	  revealed.	  In	  particular,	  the	  (potential)	  growth-­‐pull	  effect	  of	  one	  sector	  through	  increasing	  
demand	   for	   the	   output	   of	   backward	   linked	   sectors.	   It	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   promotion,	  
through	  industrial	  policy,	  of	  large-­‐scale	  (heavy)	  industries	  directly	  linked	  to	  mining	  resulted	  
in	  a	  set	  of	   tightly	   interdependent	  and	   integrated	   industries	   that	  has	  expanded	   in	   isolation	  
from,	  and	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  (labour	  intensive)	  consumer	  goods	  manufacturing.	  
	  
Although	   policy	   did	   focus	   upon	   the	   development	   of	   linked	   sectors,	   the	   aim	   of	   industrial	  
policy	   in	   the	   apartheid	   period,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   put	   forward	   for	   resource-­‐based	  
industrialisation,	   was	   not	   the	   development	   of	   an	   integrated,	   diversified	   and	   broad	   based	  
industrial	  structure.	  Industrial	  policy	  in	  the	  early	  apartheid	  period	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  need	  to	  
consolidate	   Afrikaner	   economic	   power	   therefore	   directed	   at	   industries	   with	   the	   greatest	  
growth	  potential	  and	   lent	  themselves	  to	  concentration	  of	  capital	   into	   large	  units	   (see	  Fine	  
and	   Rustomjee	   1996).	   The	   promotion	   of	   large	   scale	   sectors	   served	   the	   growth	   and	  
consolidation	  of	  Afrikaner	  capital	  based	  utilising	  the	  mining	  sector	  as	  a	  source	  of	  demand	  (as	  
in	   chemicals	   and	   electricity)	   or	   the	   source	   of	   cheap	   inputs	   (e.g.	   coal).	   Similarly,	   resource	  
based	   industrialisation	   is	   premised	   upon	   the	   exploitation	   of	   comparative	   advantage	   to	  
diversify	  vertically	   into	  higher	  value	  added	  industrial	  activities,	  making	  the	  most	  of	  growth	  
pull	   dynamics	   emerging	   from	   within	   chain	   demand.	   Whilst	   there	   had	   been	   support	   for	  
labour	  intensives	  sectors	  during	  the	  period	  of	  industrialisation	  (as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  case	  
of	   textiles	   and	   clothing),	   this	   tended	   to	   be	   ad	   hoc,	   and	   took	   place	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  
broader	  integrated	  industrial	  strategy.	  	  
	  
Important	  lessons	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  apartheid	  era	  industrial	  policies	  and	  development	  in	  
assessing	  both	  the	  potential	  and	  limitations	  of	  resource-­‐based	  industrialisation	  strategies	  in	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Africa	   today.	   Our	   contention	   is	   that	   resource-­‐based	   industrialisation	   on	   its	   own	   cannot	  
generate	  the	  type	  of	  self-­‐sustained	  and	  inclusive	  growth	  dynamics	  informed	  by	  theories	  of	  
cumulative	   causation	   and	   the	   experiences	   of	   late	   industrialising	   countries	   such	   as	   South	  
Korea.	   To	   engender	   inclusive,	   self-­‐sustaining	   industrial	   development,	   the	   exploitation	   of	  
resources	  and	  development	  of	   linked	   industries	  needs	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	   long-­‐term,	  evolving,	  





This	  paper	  has	  discussed	  the	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  and	  policy	  recommendations	  of	  the	  
recent	   debates	   around	   African	   Industrialisation	   and	   industrial	   policy	   from	   the	   New	  
Structural	   Economics	   to	   Global	   Value	   Chain	   Development,	   Vertically	   Specialised	  
Industrialisation	   and	   Resource-­‐Based	   Industrialisation.	   	   While	   the	   debate	   draws,	   albeit	  
selectively,	  on	   the	  original	   conceptualisation	  of	  manufacturing	  as	   an	  engine	   for	   (long-­‐run)	  
growth	  (see	  Lewis	  1954,	  Myrdal	  1957,	  Kaldor	  1967),	  focus	  has	  been	  on	  the	  microeconomic	  
processes	   that	   underpin	   industrial	   development,	   such	   as	   economies	   of	   agglomeration,	  
input-­‐output	   linkages,	   technology	   transfer,	   development	   of	   skills,	   learning	   and	   upgrading,	  
without	  connecting	  them	  to	  the	  dynamic,	  macroeconomic	  and	  systemic	  process	  of	  industrial	  
development	  and	  economic	  growth.	  In	  this	  way	  industrial	  policies	  have	  not	  been	  conceived	  
of	   as	   a	   gambit	   of	   diverse	   policies	   working	   together	   to	   bring	   about	   an	   integrated	   and	  
diversified	  industrial	  structure	  capable	  of	  generating	  high	  levels	  of	  employment.	  	  	  
	  
Arguments	   for	   industrial	   policy	   in	   developing	   countries	   in	   the	   current	   epoch	   have	   been	  
based	   upon	   an	   apparent	   new	   imperative	   to	   raise	   competitiveness	   of	   domestic	   industries	  
owing	   to	   heightened	   global	   competition.	   In	   contrast	   to	   the	   industrial	   policies	   during	   the	  
period	   of	   rapid	   industrialisation	   characterised	   as	   breaking	   comparative	   advantage35,	   or	  
government	  strategy	  as	  one	  of	  “getting	  prices	  wrong”	  as	  observed	  by	  Amsden	  (2001),	  NSE	  
and	   GVCD36	   conform	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   comparative	   advantage	   with	   state	   intervention	  
confined	   to	   assisting	   domestic	   firms	   in	   entering	   global	   value	   chains	   and	   upgrading	   along	  
them.	  
	  
While	  global	  value	  chain	  development	  can	  potentially	  increase	  value	  addition	  and	  promote	  
the	   growth	   of	   manufacturing	   as	   a	   share	   of	   GDP,	   and	   in	   doing	   so,	   create	   jobs,	   it	   is	   our	  
contention	   that	   such	   a	   strategy	   is	   limited	   if	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   bring	   about	   a	   broad	   based,	  
diversified	  and	   integrated	  economy	  that	  has	  the	  capacity	  not	  only	  to	  absorb	   labour	  but	  to	  
lead	  to	  rising	  wages	  and	  demand	  in	  a	  self-­‐reinforcing,	  cumulative	  and	  causal	  process.	  Gains	  
made	  along	  value	  chains	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  confined	  to	  said	  chains.	  	  Even	  within	  chains,	  results	  
for	   successful	   entry	   and	   upgrading	   by	   developing	   country	   firms	   have	   been	   mixed	   (Bair	  
2011).	   	   Our	   account	   of	   historical	   industrial	   development	   in	   South	   Africa	   also	   points	   to	  
limitations	   of	   such	   strategies	   in	   terms	   of	   developing	   a	   skewed	   industrial	   structure	   with	  
limited	  potential	  for	  labour	  absorption.	  Within	  such	  a	  strategy,	  equalising	  economic	  growth	  
can	   only	   be	   achieved	   if	   the	   gains	   from	   growth	   can	   be	   harnessed	   by	   the	   state	   for	   radical	  
redistributive	  and	  social	  policies.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  See	  Wade	  2012	  and	  Chang	  2002	  
36	  Resource	  based	  industrialisation	  in	  particular.	  
If	   the	   aim	   of	   industrial	   policy	   is	   to	   develop	   an	   industrial	   structure	   that	   supports	  
manufacturing	   led	   and	   equalising	   growth,	   then	   one	   can	   learn	   much	   from	   revisiting	   the	  
theories	   of	   classical	   political	   economy	   as	   well	   as	   the	   historical	   experiences	   of	   countries	  
during	  periods	  of	  rapid	  economic	  growth	  and	  explore	  these	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  specificities	  of	  
the	  contemporary	  global	  economy.	  While	  we	  welcome	  the	  return	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  
industrial	  development	  in	  recent	  debates,	  we	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  role,	  limited	  to	  ‘support	  
for	  the	  market’	  in	  a	  given	  global	  division	  of	  labour,	  is	  insufficient	  and	  misleading.	  Heightened	  
global	   competition	   and	   the	   existence	   of	   powerful	   multinational	   corporations	   need	   not	  
condemn	  governments	  to	  a	  policy	  of	  making	  the	  most	  of	  a	  difficult	  (competitive)	  situation.	  If	  
political	  will	  were	  to	  warrant	  it,	  there	  can	  be	  policy	  alternatives	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  equitable	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